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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals to 
hear this appeal by Section 78-2a-3(j), U.C.A. 1953, as amended 
(cases transferred from to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme 
Court)• 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are whether or not the lower 
court erred in (1) failing to consider parol evidence after finding 
as a matter of law that the parties1 April 22, 1983 letter agree-
ment contained obvious and admitted ambiguities; (2) determining 
as a matter of law that the subject agreement was not to be 
considered a brokerage agreement because there was no real property 
involved in *the transaction entitling plaintiff to an agreed 
commission upon performance; or (3) failing to recognize a 
condition precedent in the May 31, 1984 release agreement between 
the parties which had not been satisfied. 
The standard of review when considering a challenge to summary 
judgment is well settled. In reviewing a grant of summary judg-
ment, the appellate court analyzes the facts and inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party. 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Natfl Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
Since summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, the Court 
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. 
Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law 
which is reviewed on appeal for correctness. Jarman v. Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising, 794 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1990). If a trial 
court interprets a contract as a matter of law, that interpretation 
is not afforded any particular deference on appeal. Power Systems 
& Controls, Inc. v. Keith's Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah 
App. 1988). If the contract is ambiguous, but th^ case is decided 
on summary judgment, the appellate court can affirm only if the 
undisputed material facts concerning the parties1 intent 
demonstrate that the successful litigant's position is correct as 
a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Fashion Place Inv. v. Salt 
Lake County, 776 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989). 
In cases involving the interpretation of a document or an 
agreement, it is improper for a lower court considering summary 
judgment to weigh disputed evidence concerning its meaning; the 
sole inquiry is whether a genuine issue of material fact is 
presented. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Min., Inc. , 740 P.2d 1304, 
1307 (Utah 1987). Only one sworn statement is required to dispute 
averments on the other side of the controversy and create issues 
of fact precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for breach of contract to pay a commission 
which was commenced on September 12, 1985. Before trial, defendant 
submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal to the 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District Judge, which motion the 
District Court granted for the reason that the court considered the 
written agreement of the parties insufficiently clear to stand as 
a contractual agreement entitling appellant to the payment of a 
commission. The District Court acknowledged in its bench ruling 
that the language and legibility of the parties1 agreement 
presented ambiguities which made it difficult to determine the 
parties' intent. 
The court further noted in its bench ruling that a "Form A" 
filing of defendant with the North Dakota Insurance Department 
which was made for the purpose of obtaining approval of the subject 
acquisition also contained an ambiguity concerning the matter of 
a commission. The court refused to consider parol evidence which 
was available in the record to resolve either or both ambiguities 
which the court found to exist. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about April 22, 1983, a letter was directed to 
Appellant by Defendant Quist as president of S.N.L. Financial 
(S.N.L.), which set forth certain conditions including a price, 
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terms, and exchange properties which defendant S.N.L. Financial was 
willing to give in exchange for one David B. Johnson's stock 
holdings in Security International Company (SIC), a North Dakota 
corporation, the assets of which included as a wholly owned 
subsidiary Security International Insurance Company (SIIC), a 
domestic North Dakota life insurer. 
2. The subject letter of April 22, 1983 provides under item 
six (6) for a "$200,000.00 annuity", without further explanation. 
Parol evidence in the record, if considered, would establish that 
the annuity was a consideration to be paid appellant by S.N.L. as 
an agreed commission for bringing S.N.L. Financial as buyer and 
David B. Johnson as seller together on mutually agreeable terms. 
[Deposition of David B. Johnson, 24:5, Addendum, Exhibit 6; 
Affidavit of Giles H. Florence, Addendum, Exhibit 4] 
3. On or about May 19, 19S3, a definitive agreement was 
executed between S.N.L. as buyer and David B. Johnson as seller 
which set forth the detailed terms and conditions of the trans-
action, after the parties had been brought together by and the 
agreed terms had been negotiated through the appellant. The terms 
included real property and security interests in real property as 
partial consideration. [George Quist depo., 8:23-9:11, Addendum, 
Exhibit 5] 
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4. On or about September 28, 1983, defendant S.N.L. 
Financial filed with the Insurance Department of North Dakota a 
"Form A" document entitled "Statement Regarding the Acquisition of 
Control of a Domestic Insurer," setting forth the agreed terms for 
its purchase of Security International Corporation ("SIC") and its 
wholly owned subsidiary, Security International Insurance Company 
(SIIC) from David B. Johnson- [Deposition of George R. Quist, 
Addendum, Exhibit 5] 
5. Defendant's "Form A" filing acknowledged a commission or 
finder's fee obligation to be paid appellant [George Quist Depo. 
pg. 24; Form "A", Addendum, Exhibit 7], which provision the trial 
court determined to be unclear and ambiguous- [Tr. Bench Ruling, 
Addendum, Exhibit 1, pg. 45] 
6- The Boards of Directors of SIC, Security Holding, and 
S.N.L. Financial Group each by resolution unanimously approved the 
agreed transaction, and regulatory approval of the North Dakota 
Department of Insurance was obtained for the acquisition upon those 
agreed terms during the month of October 1983. [Affidavit of Giles 
Florence, Addendum, Exhibit 4] 
7* Defendants' letter agreement to appellant dated April 
22, 1983, specified certain conditions to be satisfied before the 
$200,000.00 annuity would become payable. All of those conditions 
had been satisfied by the time the parties met for closing at 
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Fargo, North Dakota on or about May 31, 1984. [Affidavit of Giles 
Florence, Addendum, Exhibit 4; Johnson depo., pg. 60, Addendum, 
Exhibit 6] 
8. At the time of closing, defendant Quist acting in his 
capacity as an officer of defendant S.N.L. unexpectedly refused to 
close according to the parties' agreement, the boards1 approval, 
and the regulatory approval which had been given; and imposed new 
terms which were unacceptable to Mr. Johnson. The sale and 
exchange accordingly failed. [Florence Affidavit, Addendum, 
Exhibit 4; Johnson depo., pgs. 53-64, Addendum, Exhibit 6] 
9. Before trial, defendants submitted a Motion for Summary 
Judgment of Dismissal to the Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District 
Judge, which motion the District Court granted for the reasons more 
fully discussed below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
The trial court determined as a matter of law that the April 
22, 1983 letter agreement was ambiguous and unclear as to its 
meaning. The court could not make out the language contained in 
the critical paragraph number six (6) which provided for a 
"$200,000 annuity", without further explanation. The document is 
unclear concerning who was to receive the annuity, when, and for 
what. Appellant maintains that the annuity was agreed to be paid 
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to him as a commission for his brokerage services. No other or 
better explanation has been offered for its existence* The trial 
court determined that the language of paragraph 6 was ambiguous; 
but failed to consider available parol or extrinsic evidence to 
determine its meaning. 
POINT II. 
The trial court erred in ruling that the April 22, 1983 letter 
agreement did not meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 
The Statute of Frauds, 25-5-4 U.C.A., 1953 as amended1, provides 
that lf[e]very agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or 
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the 
party to be charged therewith." The Statute of Frauds does not 
require that the "note or memorandum" be clear or unambiguous, but 
only that it exist. For the trial court to conclude as it did that 
the written agreement did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds because 
its meaning was unclear to the court is manifest error. 
POINT III. 
The trial court determined that the letter agreement of April 
22, 1983, did not amount to a "brokerage" agreement because it was 
1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, rewrote the 
beginning of the section and made minor stylistic changes. The 
pre-1989 amendment should apply to this case. Section 68-3-3 
U.C.A. (1986) provides that "[n]o part of these revised statutes 
is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." See also Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988). 
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unclear and there was no "real property" involved in the trans-
action. The letter agreement identified certain real property 
which was to be exchanged in the transaction, and a brokerage 
agreement need not involve real property at alle The trial court 
erred by ignoring the fact that real property was involved, and in 
applying an interpretation of the term "broker" which makes it 
applicable only to real property transactions. Appellant was 
clearly acting as a "broker" from a legal standpoint. 
POINT IV. 
The trial court erred in considering the effect of the 
parties1 subsequent May 31, 1984 agreement, which contained an 
unsatisfied condition precedent; specifically the unobtained 
approval of a third party. Appellant contends that the trial court 
failed to consider the entire transaction and both agreements as 
a whole in order to determine the parties1 intent, once the court 
determined that ambiguity existed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
INTERPRETATION OF A CONTRACT IS EITHER 
A QUESTION OF LAW OR A QUESTION OF FACT 
The interpretation of a contract is either a question of law, 
which is to be determined by the words of the agreement; or a 
question of fact to be determined by considering extrinsic evidence 
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concerning the parties1 intent. Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Heriford, 772 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1989); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 
P. 2d 714 (Utah 1985). A determination of ambiguity must be made 
before the court will consider parol or extrinsic evidence of the 
parties1 intent. Once an ambiguity is found to exist, available 
extrinsic evidence is admissible and must be considered. 
The language in a written document is considered ambiguous if 
the words used in the contract may be understood to support two or 
more plausible meanings. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 131 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 28, 31 (Ct.App. 1990). 
A* THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED THE APRIL 22, 1983 AGREEMENT 
TO BE AMBIGUOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The Utah Supreme Court in Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 
1292 (Utah 1983), held: 
[w]hen a contract is ambiguous, because of uncertain 
meaning of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies, parol evidence is admissible to explain the 
parties' intent.2 Whether an ambiguity exists is a 
question of law to be decided before parol evidence may 
be admitted. As this court stated in Big Butte Ranch, 
Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977): 
[T]he court should first examine the language 
of the instruments and accord to it the weight 
and effect which it may show was intended and 
if the meaning is ambiguous or uncertain then 
consider parol evidence of the parties' 
intentions. 
Grow v, Marwick Development, Inc., 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 
1980). 
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Of course^ a motion for summary judgment may 
not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached 
that an ambiguity exists in the contract and 
there is a factual issue as to what the parties 
intended. (Emphasis added) Id, at 691. 
Ironically, the trial court in this case made a legal con-
clusion that ambiguity existed and then granted summary judgment 
because of the ambiguity, without any attempt to resolve it by 
considering available extrinsic evidence or allowing the question 
to be decided by a jury. Referring to the $200,000.00 annuity 
provision, the trial court stated in its bench ruling [Addendum, 
Exhibit 1]: 
....I could not make it all out (page 45) 
....it does not spell out anything really as far as the 
terms (page 46) 
....But this one just does not even get to the heart of 
it as far as indicating what is going to be done as far 
as the payment of a finders, a brokerage fee (Page 46) 
.... I am not persuaded that either the wording in 
paragraph 6 or the wording in the Form A is sufficient 
of a brokerage agreement to satisfy that a commission 
would be paid upon the broker finding a willing and able 
buyer (Page 45) 
....I don't think the letter of April 22nd or anything 
in Form A satisfies [sic] the requirement of the law of 
the Statute of Frauds or the requirement as far as what 
must be in writing for a brokerage. (Page 46) 
.... I am of the opinion that the wording in the April 
22nd letter and the Form A is not sufficient to spell out 
that anything was going to be paid regardless of what 
took place. I think the parties came down to it, that 
they did negotiate, and there may have been some 
misunderstanding as far as what was supposed to be paid 
rtol Mr.Florence. (Page 47, emphasis added) 
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By those statements, the trial court expressed its inability 
to comprehend the parties1 intent because the written language 
employed was illegible and ambiguous. Inexplicably, the court 
refused to consider available extrinsic evidence of the parties' 
intent although it was clearly brought to the court's attention in 
memoranda and argument. In effect, the trial court resolved the 
issue by determining that it could not understand what the parties 
intended from the language used, and that since the court could not 
discern the parties' intent from the written language, the 
agreement was unenforceable; regardless what the other evidence 
outside the writing itself may disclose concerning its meaning. 
That view does violence to the Parol Evidence Rule, which exists 
for the very purpose of resolving such ambiguities. 
The trial court's ruling in that respect is not in accord with 
prevailing authority. As indicated above, the interpretation of 
a contract may either be a question of law, to be determined by the 
words of the agreement if they are clear and unambiguous; or a 
question of fact to be determined by extrinsic evidence of intent. 
Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Heriford, 772 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 
1989). If the contract is found to be ambiguous and the trial 
court makes findings regarding the intent of the parties, on appeal 
those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Id. at 468. It would follow that if the trial court 
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determines the contract to be ambiguous and makes no findings 
regarding the intent of the parties but dismisses because of the 
ambiguity, that failure would constitute reversible error. Such 
is the posture of this case. The trial court made no attempt to 
determine the intent of the parties, after having found the 
critical ambiguity. 
In C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willev, 758 P.2d 923, 929 (Utah App. 
1988), the Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's order granting 
defendant's motion for summary judgment with the following 
language: 
Since the very essence of a finder's arrangement is 
locating buyers with whom a seller might do business.. .it 
would be extraordinary if the trial court were to 
conclude, absent a contractual provision expressly and 
unambiguously so providing, that the parties really meant 
to exclude certain properties from the scope of their 
agreement. (Emphasis in original) Nonetheless, the 
ambiguity in the contract leaves that possibility open. 
That ambiguity creates a material factual issue making 
summary judgment inappropriate and requiring resort to 
extrinsic evidence by the fact finder in an effort to 
determine what the parties actually intended. (Emphasis 
added) IsL. at 929. 
An ambiguity obviously exists in paragraph six (6) of the 
April 22, 1983, agreement pertaining to the $200,000.00 annuity. 
As the trial court correctly observed, that provision has no clear 
meaning without further explanation.3 It does not state to whom 
3
 Trial Court's Bench Ruling, page 45-6 (Addendum, Exhibit 1) 
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the annuity is to be paid, when, or for what. Standing alone, it 
has no apparent meaning; yet it must mean something or the parties 
would not have written it into their agreement. Available parol 
evidence clearly discloses its meaning and should have been 
considered by the court, but was not. 
Appellant maintains, and his position is amply supported by 
the record, that paragraph six (6) of the April 22, 1983 agreement 
provides for his commission, payable subject to the conditions 
appearing above it; that each of those conditions were satisfied; 
and that the commission was thereby earned. Those assertions are 
supported by the deposition testimony of the seller, Mr. David 
Johnson, which the trial court failed to consider. Defendants have 
offered no other or better explanation for the $200,000.00 annuity 
provision, despite close questioning in the Quist depositions 
concerning its meaning and intent. There is quite simply no other 
or better meaning to be given the language used than that suggested 
by the appellant.4 
The trial court determined that the opposing affidavit 
of plaintiff was "flawed" but did not identify any particular 
portions that did not conform to Rule 56(e). There are clearly 
certain portions of the Florence affidavit which are admissible and 
pertain to the parties' intent in the April 22, 1983 agreement. 
The trial court disregarded all matters it considered to be 
extrinsic evidence. 
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Under applicable law, to the extent there is ambiguity there 
exists an issue of fact which, standing alone, precludes summary 
judgment. Parol evidence is always to be considered upon a finding 
of ambiguity in such cases to explain the parties1 intent; which 
may indeed be explained in no other way. Faulkner, at 1293. 
Where intent is at issue, under Utah law it must be determined 
by a finder of fact and cannot be resolved by summary judgment* 
The Appellate Court in C.J. Realty, supra, held: 
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the parties intended the property at issue to be 
included in the contract, we reverse the trial court's 
summary judgment and remand for further factual findings 
consistent with this opinion. Id. at 929.(emphasis 
added) 
Only when contract terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous 
can they be interpreted as such by the judge and made a basis for 
summary judgment. Colonial Leasing v. Larson Bros. Const., 731 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). If the evidence as to the terms of an 
agreement is in conflict, the intent of the parties as to the terms 
of the agreement may only be determined by the use of extrinsic 
evidence, and submission to a jury. Id. at 488. In this case the 
trial court did neither. Where questions arise in the interpre-
tation of an agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the 
document itself. It should be looked at in its entirety and in 
accordance with its purpose. All of its parts should be given 
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effect insofar as that is possible. Regional Sales Agency, Inc. 
v. Reichert, 122 Utah Adv.Rep. 46, 48 (Ct. App. 1989)(quoting Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)). When that process fails to produce a clear 
meaning and intent, other evidence should, and must, be considered. 
In this case it quite clearly was not. 
It remains uncertain from the contract language itself whether 
paragraph six (6) of the April 22, 1983 agreement was contemplated 
a commission to be paid appellant for his successful efforts in 
bringing the buyer and seller together on mutually agreeable terms, 
was part of the consideration to be paid by S.N.L. for purchase of 
SIC, or was something else. Since two or more plausible meanings 
can be derived from the language used (to the extent it is 
legible), and the trial court failed to consider available parol 
evidence to determine the parties1 intent; the trial court clearly 
erred in ruling as it did.5 
B. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER 
PAROL EVIDENCE TO RESOLVE AMBIGUITY IN THE 
PARTIES1 APRIL 22, 1983 AGREEMENT. 
It is the well-settled general rule that if an agreement is 
ambiguous because of lack of clarity in the meaning of particular 
Jarman v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 794 P.2d 492 (Utah 
App. 1990); Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Daskalas, 
785 P.2d 1112, 1118 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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terms, it is subject to parol evidence concerning what the parties 
intended. Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros, Const., 731 P.2d 
483 (Utah 1986).6 
Appellant maintains that the trial court erred in refusing to 
consider extrinsic or parol evidence which was available in the 
record to resolve ambiguity in the April 22, 1983 letter agreement 
between the parties. As indicated, the trial court in its bench 
ruling determined that paragraph six (6) of the letter agreement 
was ambiguous and for that reason insufficient to constitute an 
enforceable contract; without considering extrinsic or parol 
evidence which was available to resolve the ambiguity and clarify 
the parties1 intent. The Utah Supreme Court in Ron Case Roofing 
& Asphalt v. Blomcuist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) stated: 
[The Court] first looks to the four corners of the 
agreement to determine the intentions of the parties and 
the use of extrinsic evidence is permitted only if the 
document appears to incompletely express the parties1 
agreement or if it is ambiguous in expressing that 
agreement. 
The trial court in this case did not first "look to the four 
corners" of the letter agreement as a whole. The court considered 
only the language contained in paragraph six (6) which it deter-
mined was ambiguous and therefore not sufficient "of a brokerage 
Citing Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983) 
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agreement." Viewing the subject agreement as a whole, several 
points are established. The agreement is between the appellant 
and the defendants. The agreement sets forth the financial terms 
for the purchase of S.I.C. by S.N.L. Financial. The agreement 
provides for an annuity in the amount of $200,000.00 which is not 
part of the consideration to be given for S.I.C. Available parol 
evidence in the record discloses that the $200,000.00 annuity 
represents an agreed broker's commission to appellant for bringing 
the buyer and seller together on mutually agreeable terms. 
As a matter of law, the trial court committed error in not 
considering extrinsic or parol evidence to determine the parties1 
intent. The parties and the court acknowledge that the language 
of paragraph six is somewhat illegible and that, standing alone, 
it is ambiguous to the extent it is legible. If its' meaning or 
the parties' intent is to be understood, other evidence is 
required. Other evidence was available in the record but was not 
considered by the court. 
In Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987), the court 
stated "[I]t is not necessary, however, that the contract itself 
contain all the particulars of the agreement. The crucial factor 
is that the parties agreed on the essential elements of the 
Tr. Bench Ruling, pg. 45. 
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contract•" In the present case, SeN.L. agreed in writing as part 
of its agreement to pay someone a $200,000.00 annuity for 
something. That item was not a part of the purchase price, and 
from the available, but unconsidered evidence, it is undisputed 
that the $200,000.00 annuity was in fact the appellant's 
commission. Mr. Johnson did not regard that item as part of his 
consideration from SNL. He understood and has testified that the 
$200,000.00 annuity was in fact the appellant's commission.8 The 
appellant has testified he understood that to be the case, and the 
defendants have provided no other explanation. The hard fact is 
that paragraph six annuity was the appellant's commission, and 
nothing else. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT THE AGREEMENT DID NOT SATISFY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The trial court stated: 
I am not persuaded that either the wording in 
paragraph 6 or the wording in the Form A is sufficient 
of a brokerage agreement to satisfy that a commission 
would be paid upon the broker finding a willing and able 
buyer. I don't think it's sufficient writing to meet 
that requirement and must be in writing under the Statute 
of Frauds.9 
Johnson depo., pg. 24, Addendum, Exhibit 6. 
Tr.Bench Ruling, pages 4-5 [Addendum, Exhibit 1]. 
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The Statute of Frauds, 25-5-4 U.C.A., 1953 as amended7", 
provides that lf[e]very agreement shall be void unless such 
agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith•" Since the 
document is unquestionably a "note or memorandum" of some agreement 
between the parties and is subscribed by the "party to be charged" 
(S.N.L.)/ it obviously satisfies the Statute of Frauds. The trial 
court erred in ruling that the April 22, 1983 letter agreement did 
not. 
It is also well settled that the Statute of Frauds does not 
preclude a party from proving the true nature of an agreement when 
that is the issue, rather than enforceability.11 In this case, the 
only issue presented on summary judgment was whether there existed 
an agreement which provided Appellant a commission. The Statute 
of Frauds does not require that the "note or memorandum" be clear 
or unambiguous, but only that it exist. For the trial court to 
conclude as it did that the written agreement did not satisfy the 
1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, rewrote the 
beginning of the section and made minor stylistic changes. The 
pre-1989 amendment should apply to this case. Section 68-3-3 
U.C.A. (1986) provides that "[n]o part of these revised statutes 
is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." See also Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988). 
11
 Colonial Leasing v. Larson Bros. Const.f 731 P.2d 483, 
486 (Utah 1986). 
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Statute of Frauds because its meaning was unclear to the court is 
manifest error J2 
In order to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, 
Utah courts have held that the required "memorandum must identify 
the parties, subject matter, and set out the conditions of the 
transaction with adequate certainty." Furthermore, "the memorandum 
must show what the contract was, and not merely note the fact that 
some contract was made." Machan Hampshire v. Western Real Estate, 
779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah App* 1989)(emphasis added). The subject 
agreement clearly meets the above requirements by identifying the 
parties13, subject matter14, and conditions15 of the transaction. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS 
NOT A BROKERAGE AGREEMENT ENTITLING APPELLANT TO 
AN AGREED COMMISSION UPON COMPLETION OF HIS PERFORMANCE. 
By definition, a "broker" is a person whose duties are not 
limited to the sale of real property. Black's Law Dictionary, 174 
Footnote 2, supra. 
13
 The April 22, 1983 agreement was addressed to the 
appellant and signed by appellee George Quist. [Addendum, Exhibit 
2] 
14
 Subject matter of the April 22, 1983 set forth with 
particularity the items for purchase by SNL. [Addendum, Exhibit 2] 
15
 Conditions are set forth in the first paragraph of the 
April 22, 1983 agreement. [Addendum, Exhibit 2] 
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(5th Ed.) defines a "broker" as: 
An agent employed to make bargains and contracts for 
a compensation. A middleman or negotiator between 
parties A person whose business it is to bring buyer 
and seller together. The term extends to almost every 
branch of business, to realty as well as personalty. 
The trial court narrowly considered appellant's role as a 
"broker" to be limited to the sale of real property.16 The trial 
court stated: "I so find that, I don't think that this is a 
brokerage situation. There is not the sale of real property here* 
... Therefore, I don't think that law applies at the outset*"17 
The court obviously erred in disregarding the fact that the 
agreement on its face involves several pieces of real property as 
part of the consideration to be given for S.I.C. [Addendum, 
exhibit 2]; and in overlooking the fact that a broker's rights and 
duties are not limited to transactions only involving "real 
property." 
The general rule accepted in Utah is that a "broker" has 
earned his commissions upon the procuring of a buyer who is ready, 
willing and able to buy on terms acceptable to the seller. This 
general rule applies whether or not real property is involved. 
Lanaston v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 (Utah 1987); Bushnell Real 




Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983)* Significantly 
to this case, the court in Lanaston held: 
Absent a contractual provision which conditions the 
right to a commission on the performance or part 
performance of the buyer, the broker is not an 
insurer of the subsequent performance of the 
contract and is not deprived of his right to a 
commission by the failure or refusal of the buyer 
to perform. Lanaston, at 558. (Emphasis added) 
In this case, the evidence if it were allowed to be considered 
by a finder of fact would establish the existence of a commission 
agreement, full performance by the broker, and an unexcused refusal 
to perform at the time of closing by defendant S.N.L., the buyer. 
Appellant is entitled to have that evidence fully and fairly 
considered by a fact finder. 
A broker cannot control the parties1 behavior after a 
definitive agreement to buy and sell has been reached, but can only 
bring the buyer and seller together on mutually agreeable terms. 
This the appellant did at his own effort and his own expense in 
consideration for S.N.L.'s promise to pay him a commission if he 
succeeded in doing so. The Appellant, as a broker, can do no more 
than that. Under Utah law, he is entitled to his commission under 
the facts of this case. Resolving the ambiguities should be left 
to a jury rather than being preempted by summary judgment. 
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POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE 
A CONDITION PRECEDENT IN THE MAY 31, 1984 RELEASE 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH HAD NOT BEEN SATISFIED. 
Appellees argued in support of their motion for summary 
judgment that the parties1 May 31, 1984 agreement [Addendum, 
exhibit 3] superceded the April 22, 1983 agreement; and that 
failure of the sale to actually close precluded appellant from 
claiming his commission. Appellant argued that the May 31, 1984 
agreement was prospective and void for failure to satisfy one of 
its conditions precedent; namely the approval of a third party. 
Although the trial court did not base its ruling upon the May 31, 
1984 document because it found there to be no brokerage agreement, 
the court did indicate that if there were a brokerage agreement, 
the condition precedent would be considered of no importance. [Tr. 
Bench Ruling, pg. 45, addendum exhibit 1] 
The plain language of the May 31, 1984 document includes a 
"subject to" provision requiring prior approval by the third party 
which was never forthcoming. The law of contracts is well settled 
regarding such conditions precedent and the necessity of satisfying 
them before the agreement becomes enforceable.18 Restatement of 
Contracts (Second) Section 225 states the general rule as follows: 
17 Am. Jur.2d Contracts, Section 320 et.seq (1964). 
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Performance of a duty subject to a condition cannot 
become due unless the condition occurs or its non-
occurrence is excused.. 
Unless it has been excused, the non-occurrence of 
a condition discharges the duty when the condition can 
no longer occur. (Emphasis added) 
The second paragraph of the May 31, 1984 agreement specific-
ally creates a condition precedent to the entire May 31, 1984 
agreement, which it is undisputed never occurred. That paragraph 
provides: 
"This agreement is subject to approval of Mr. Joseph 
Henroid of the law firm of Nielson and Senior of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, particularly in regard to that certain 
court order of approximately October 1983 regarding the 
divorce of Giles H. and Ululani Florence." (Emphasis 
added) 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Welch Transfer 
and Storage, Inc. v. Oldham, 663 P.2d 73 (Utah 1983): 
Where fulfillment of a contract is made to depend 
upon the act or consent of a third person over whom 
neither party has control, the contract cannot be 
enforced unless the act is performed or the consent 
given.(citations omitted)(Emphasis added) 
In this case, the trial court indicated that the condition 
requiring approval by a third party had "no bearing whatsoever as 
far as this situation is concerned."19 That view is contrary to 
well established principles of contract law. 
Bench Ruling, page 45 [Addendum, exhibit 1] 
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The basic objective in construing any contract must be to give 
effect to the intentions of the parties. If possible, those 
intentions must be determined from an examination of the texts of 
the agreements. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat. Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 
(Utah 1987); DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978); Qberhanslv 
v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977). It is apparent in this case 
both that the trial court failed to view the two written documents 
as a whole, or harmonize them if possible. Upon finding that 
ambiguities existed, the trial court failed to consider available 
evidence of the parties' intent outside the April 22, 1983 
agreement and without such evidence held the agreement to be 
unenforceable. The trial court then suggested that if there were 
an enforceable brokerage agreement the May 31, 1984 release 
agreement would apply, while failing to recognize the significance 
of a failed condition precedent to that agreement. The trial court 
erred in disregarding the significance of the failed condition 
precedent. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed reversible error in failing to 
consider extrinsic or parol evidence to determine the intent of the 
parties' April 22, 1983 letter agreement, after finding as a matter 
of law that the agreement was unclear and ambiguous. The trial 
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court erred in granting summary judgment after making that 
determination because the court's finding in and of itself legally 
acknowledged that a genuine issue of material fact exists, namely 
the meaning of the ambiguous terms. The trial court failed to 
follow the basic legal process in construing any ambiguous contract 
term by considering extrinsic evidence of the parties1 intent. 
The trial court erred in determining that the parties' 
agreement did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, since the parties 
to be charged did in fact sign a "note or memorandum" of their 
agreement. 
The trial court erred in determining that the parties1 
agreement was not a brokerage agreement entitling Appellant to a 
commission upon completion of his performance, for the stated 
reason that the court did not understand real property to be 
involved in that agreement. 
Finally, the trial court erred in failing to recognize the 
significance of a failed condition precedent in the May 31, 1984 
prospective release agreement between the parties. 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's 
order granting Appellee a summary judgment of dismissal should be 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with applicable law. The trial court's errors are so numerous and 
apparent that this court should clearly set forth the applicable 
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standards for the trial court's guidance on remand. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ±^ day of April, 1991. 
^ANTHONY M. THURBER 
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present and ready to 
intiff is, your Honor. 
And the defendant? 
And the defendant is ready, 
Then you may proceed. Would 
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Anthony M. Thurber for the 
Arthur H. Nielsen, attorney 






If it please the 
I would like to 
tions of George 
by the plaintiff 












the matter of the Motion for 
Court, and counsel, at 
the publication of the 
the 
and Scott Quist which were 
years ago, your Honor. 
, apparently the origina 





























original deposition of Mr. George Quist. But I have 
asked Mr. Thurber if he has any objection to using a 
Certified Copy, and he said no. And I have the 
Certified Copy here before me and would like to have it 
published and would like to refer to it during the 
course of my argument. 
THE COURT: Any problem, counsel? 
MR. THURBER: No. 
MR. NIELSEN: 





Scott Quist put it 
to my office by yes 
s morning and it was 
I would like to fi 
Court desires to pursue 
as I know, I don't beli 
With reference to the original 
Quist, we did locate that. And , 
in the mail to me and it didn't 
terday. And I went down again 
not there. I would only have to 
le that with the Court if the 
it in any respect. But as far 
eve his 
significant in connection with 
I don't intend to utili ze it. 
plaintiff does, I'll certainly 
the original during the day. 
Now, again as a pre] 




sure, reviewed the I 
as counsel for the 
I would like to mak 
deposition will be 
the argument. If it is, 
And if counsel for the 
see that your Honor gets 
.iminary matter in the 
this morning, your Honor has, 
Motion i :or Summary Judgment as 
plaintiff's opposition thereto. 



























reference to the counterobjections to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment which were filed by the plaintiff, to 
the extent that they rely upon the evidence of 
Mr. Florence, we object to the use of that Affidavit 
because it is not in conformity with Rule 56 of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure relating to affidavits to be 
filed in connection with summary judgments. 
Let me just read to your Honor Rule 56(e) 
which provides as to the form of affidavits that further 
testimony defense is required. 
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall 
be made on personal knowledge, s 
forth such facts as would be adm 
hall set 
issible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matter stated therein." 
Now, on its face the Affidavit says that itfs 
based upon the best knowledge and belief of the client. 
And therefore, the jurat, itself, does not conform to 
the rule. But a very casual perusal of that 
would indicate to your Honor that it is full 
j conclusions, interpretations of the witness, 
opinions, so to speak, and is not based upon 
client's actual knowledge. 







1 Affidavit that would be pertinent. And to the extent 
2 that your Honor feels that they are, I certainly have no 
3 objection to your Honor considering them. But above 
4 all, I think that it is significant to note that, in our 
5 opinion, they do not identify any relevant evidence in 
6 this matter* 
7 Let me just point to two items in the 
8 evidence that I think clearly identify or illustrate 
9 what I am referring to. First of all, the Affidavit 
10 refers to a certain exhibit, our document, which the 
11 Affidavit states was the final agreement between 
12 Mr. Johnson, who is the principal owner of the Security 
13 International Life Insurance Company and S.N.L. 
14 Financial. And that document, itself, on page 3, when 
15 it is identified by Mr. Florence in his Affidavit as the 
16 final agreement states on its face, "...with definite 
17 agreement to follow." In other words, these were 
18 preliminary negotiations. And the parties, themselves, 
19 over their signature said, this would have to be 
20 followed by a definite agreement. 
21 Likewise, Mr. Florence in his Affidavit 
22 refers to a letter dated May 31, 1984, on which we rely 
23 as a matter of fact, addressed to G.H. Ill National 
24 Corporation of Las Vegas, Nevada in which S.N.L. 


























the transaction described below, S.N.L. Financial 
Corporation agrees to pay to your company $50,000," and 
it goes on in the recital. 
The final paragraph says, 
"This agreement is subject to approval of 
Mr. Joseph Henroid of the law firm of 
Nielsen & Senior of Salt Lake City, j 
particularly in regard to that certain court 
order of approximately October 1983 
regarding the divorce of Giles H. and Euloni 
Florence." 
The Affidavit then goes on to say that 
Mr. Henroid was not approached and did not approve it. 
Obviously Mr. Florence could not know that. If he was 
the one that had the duty to do it, he could testify 
that he did not do it. But whether somebody else did it 
or not, he obviously couldn't testify. 
But it is, I think, of some significance that 
there was a divorce pending between Mr. Florence and 
Mrs. Florence in the State of Arizona. And a suit was 
filed in this court by Mrs. Florence against S.N.L. 
stating that, if and when there was any commission 
payable to Mr. Florence, that there be an injunction 
issued prohibiting Mr. Florence or the S.N.L. 


























matter, I'm sure, that precipitated this kind of a 
statement. 
In other words, S.N.L. couldn't pay 
Mr. Florence anything, even if it owed it to him under 
that order. But for the purpose again of this record, 
your Honor, and the particular case here filed in this 
case — I can give you the case number — that did 
dissolve that injunction. So again, that matter would 
not be, in my opinion, relevant to this case. 
Now, with those 
state that there was a fina 
entered into by Mr. Johnson 
Mr. Johnson with S.N.L. Cor 
preliminary remarks, let me 
1 and formal agreement 
, not Mr. Florence but by 
poration with respect to the 
purchase by S.N.L. Corporation of Mr. Johnson's stock in 
the Security International Corporation, Security 
International Insurance Company. I guess we need to 
distinguish between the two 
S.N.L. by its initials, and 
corporation in North Dakota 
corporation. At least that 
Now, I point out 
of a preliminary background 
companies. We could call 
we could refer to the other 
as the "international" 
word is in its name. 
to your Honor, again by way 
statement, that in order for 
S.N.L. Corporation to acquire the stock of the 
international corporation ii 
necessary that the matter b< 
a North Dakota, it was 



























Department of North Dakota. Everyone agrees to that. 
For that purpose S.N.L. Corporation had hired a 
Mr. Gilbert McSwain of Denver, a securities lawyer who 
had done work both for S.N.L. Corporation and also for 
the international North Dakota corporation in times past 
relating to their securities matters. 
But in this particular situation, Mr. McSwain 
was employed by S.N.L. Corporation to prepare all of the 
necessary documents to submit to the Insurance 
Department of North Dakot 
of this acquisition. And 
document sometimes referr 
a for confirmation and approval 
that is done under a formal 
ed to as a prospectus but 
principally referred to as a Form A. And I'll be 
referring to that Form A 
here, again to bring your 
think it becomes critical 
That Form A is 
deposition. And if the c 
deposition of Mr. Quist, 
Exhibit 4 which is a rath 
of a number of sections. 
Approximately 
center of this Form A is 
in the course of my discussion 
Honor up to the point where I 
with reference to our motion. 
Exhibit 4 to Mr. Quist's 
lerk would hand your Honor the 
I would like you to refer to 
er lengthy document consisting 
in the first third or near the 
a document entitled Stock 
Purchase Agreement. I wish, your Honor, that I could 
give you better identification for it, but it follows 
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1 immediately after page 29 and is identified as 
2 Appendix B. 
3 THE COURT: Well, I have got page 29. 
4 MR. NIELSEN: Whatfs the next page? 
5 THE COURT: Page 30. 
6 MR. NIELSEN: Then you have the wrong 
7 section. May I come to the bench? 
8 THE COURT: You may. 
9 MR. NIELSEN: This is the formal final 
10 agreement between Mr. Johnson and S.N.L. Corporation, 
11 which of course had to be submitted along with the 
12 other documents to the Department of Insurance of North 
13 Dakota for the purpose of confirming and confirmation 
14 of this transaction. And it was approved by the 
15 Department of Insurance. 
16 Now, with regard to that Stock Purchase 
17 Agreement, let me identify for your Honor two or three 
18 items in it that I think are of significance here, 
19 particularly as they relate to the Affidavit of 
20 Mr. Florence, as well as to other response by the 
21 plaintiff in this matter with respect to our Motion for 
2 2 Summary Judgment. 
23 Paragraph 1.1 on page 2 is the Agreement of 
24 the Seller to sell his stock in the corporations known 
25 as Security International Insurance Company, as well as 
9 
1 Security Insurance National Corporation. Point 1.3 is 
2 the Agreement of the Purchaser. The Agreement of the 
3 Purchaser says that, 
4 "At the closing purchaser shall purchase 
5 and accept the sales from the seller for an 
6 aggregate version of the following..." 
7 And then on the following page, page 3, there 
8 identifies all of the consideration that S.N.L. 
9 Corporation is to pay for Mr. Johnson's stock. 
10 Now, if you were to review that very 
11 carefully, and we can go over it for all of those assets 
12 that are to be transferred, you will note, your Honor, 
13 that there is nothing said about, quote, "renewal 
14 commissions," or anything of that kind. This is a 
15 matter which, although Mr. Florence says they got in an 
16 argument about that matter, that's not a part of this 
17 Agreement. So if they did get into an argument about 
18 it, it had no relevance about whether there was an 
19 agreement to sell or not to sell. 
20 The next page, on page 4, paragraph 2.2 says 
21 that, "There are no conflicting agreements." This is a 
22 representation and warranty by Mr. Johnson. So if he 
23 had some other conflicting agreement with reference to 
24 this, that he represents that there are none. 
25 If you carry on then to page 6, paragraph 
10 
1 2.8, subparagraph (c) near the top of the page, he also 
2 warrants that, 
3 "There are no employment or deferred 
4 compensation agreements between S.I.C or 
5 S.I. I.C. and its shareholders, officers, 
6 directors, employees, agents or 
7 consultants." 
8 Well, Mr. Johnson was president of both of 
9 those companies. And here he represents and warrants 
10 that there are no conflicting agreements as to any kind 
11 of compensation that he is supposed to get. 
12 Paragraph (f) also states that any 
13 indebtedness, 
14 "There is no indebtedness or other 
15 liability or obligation, whether absolute, 
16 accrued, contingent or otherwise incurred or 
17 other transaction engaged in by S.I.C or 
18 S.I.I.C. except in the ordinary course of 
19 business with the parties, other than 
20 seller, which is material." 
21 So now he is saying there is none with any --
22 with him with S.I.C or with S.I.I.C. 
23 May I then ask your Honor to turn to 
24 paragraph 10 — excuse me, page 10, paragraph 5. In the 































"The obligations of each party to 
consummate this Agreement and the 
transaction to be consummated by them 
hereunder on the closing shall be subject to 
the satisfaction prior to or concurrently 
with the closing of each of the conditions 
set forth in this Section 5." 
Then it goes on to delineate what those items 
so that there can be no question about the fact 
there are to be no changes or no inconsistency. 
Paragraph 9, then we come to a very 
interesting paragraph on page 12. Paragraph 9 says, 
"Closing of this Agreement and certain of 
the transactions provided for herein shall 
take place at the offices of Keller, 
McSwain, Wing and Maxfield — " noting, your 
Honor, that McSwain is the attorney who is 
handling this matter — "in the City of 
Denver, Colorado at 10 a.m. local time, not 
later than the third business day following 
the day that seller acquires the shares, or 
such other time as the parties may mutually 
agree." 
Now, Mr. Florence in his Affidavit says that 
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1 they met up in North Dakota on the 31st of May to close 
2 it. Mr. McSwain was not there. And this Agreement says 
3 they'll close it in Denver in Mr. McSwain's office. 
4 Mr. Quist in his deposition says they didn't meet up 
5 there for the purpose of closing but to negotiate 
6 because there were some changes which Mr. Johnson wanted 
7 to make. 
8 But that I am merely again pointing out to 
9 your Honor in terms of the background. And I would 
10 confess that if that is a critical matter, then there is 
11 a dispute. But I don't think it is critical. It just 
12 merely points out the inaccuracy, so to speak, of 
13 Mr. Florence's Affidavit. But it does illustrate the 
14 position that I am going to present to your Honor in 
15 just a moment or two. 
16 On the following page, page 13, it says that, 
17 "Each party hereto shall pay its own 
18 expenses in connection with this Agreement 
19 and the transaction contemplated hereby." 
20 And the final one which I think is very 
21 important, paragraph 13.1 says, 
22 "This Agreement supersedes all prior 
23 discussions and agreements between the 
24 parties with respect to the sale of the 
25 shares and the other matters contained in 
13 
1 this Agreement. And this Agreement, 
2 including the exhibits hereto, contain the 
3 sole and entire agreement between the 
4 parties hereto with reference to the 
5 transactions contemplated hereby." 
6 Now, regardless of anything else, these 
7 exhibits to Mr. Florence's deposition, or Affidavit, 
8 clearly now are superseded by this final Agreement 
9 entered into by Mr. Johnson and S.N.L. Corporation and 
10 submitted to the Insurance Department of North Dakota 
11 for its approval. • So we are not concerned here with 
12 these writings which have formed a part of 
13 Mr. Florence's Affidavit. 
14 One other point, then I'll get down to the 
15 critical matter, is that Mr. Florence said that one of 
16 the first things that happened — again referring to his 
17 deposition — when they got in the meeting up in North 
18 Dakota on the 31st of May was that he and Mr. Quist got 
19 into an argument about what commission he was supposed 
20 to get. And Mr. Quist said he was going to deduct the 
21 expenses from any commission which Mr. Florence would 
22 get when the deal was finally closed. And Mr. Florence 
23 says that was not a part of the transaction. 
24 Let me refer your Honor to an earlier portion 



























portion of it. But it is on page 26 of the section just 
before 
would g 




the one that we referred to. So if your Honor 
fo back to the first of that exhibit, or Appendix 
just two pages before that I think is page 26. 
Do you have it? 
THE COURT: Section 15? 
MR. NIELSEN: Yes. Here again this is the 
that's submitted to the insurance department for 
roval. In this it refers to commissions and 
s fees. 
"S.I.C and Security Holding agree that 
Mr. Giles Florence of Phoenix, Arizona has 
acted as a finder in connection with the 
transactions contemplated herein and that no 
other party will serve as a finder. The 
parties agree that their respective expenses 
— " talking about the parties was the seller 
and the buyer -- "they agree that their 
respective expenses incurred and to be 
incurred in connection with the transaction 
contemplated hereby — including without 
limitation attorney fees, accountants fees, 
travel, printing, mailing and postage --



























So here it is stated before the Insurance 
Department of North Dakota that these expenses which 
Mr. Florence was apparently objecting to be deducted 
from his fee when the matter was closed were already 
identified, had been approved by the Department of 
Insurance, and they were to all of these expenses 
including attorney fees of the parties and all other 
expenses to be deducted from whatever fee he was going 
to get. 
Now, let me address now what I considered to 
be the substance of our Motion for Summary Judgment. 
All other matters aside, we find the parties up in 
Fargo, North Dakota on the 31st of May of 1984, almost a 
year after the negotiations for the purchase of this 
stock had begun. And at that time 
we don!t dispute the fact that Mr. 
concerned about getting a fee when 
it is recognized and 
Florence was 
this matter closed. 
And he was concerned that these expenses were going to 
be deducted. 
Mr. Quist, on the other hand, took the 
position that when they got the matter closed -- and 
they were there for some period of 
had even been prepared according tc 
time, no documents 
) the testimony of 
everybody. They were there to further discuss the 



























no argument about the fact that he should get a fee. He 
had rendered some services as a finder. The question 
was, one, how much it was going to be; and two, when was 
he to get it and the conditions incident thereto. And 










But Mr. Florence did not want to get the 
wanted it paid to a third party. So Exhibits A 
our Motion for Summary Judgment, also Exhibit 5 
. Quist's deposition, came into being. Exhibit B 
Release. And this Release says that, 
N.L. 
"I, Giles H. Florence, in consideration 
--" note, your Honor, it says — "in 
consideration of a letter dated May 31, 1984 
from George R. Quist of S.N.L. Financial 
Corporation hereby agree to release and 
forever discharge all of the following 
corporations and persons from any further 
liability relating to the matters described 
in the letter referred to." 
And then the first corporation listed on that 
Financial Corporation. 
We submit, your Honor, this resolves any 
between Mr. Florence and S.N.L. Corporation in 
matter. This document has released. 
Now, however, there was to be consideration 
17 
1 for it. So the second document, also dated May 31, 
2 1984, which is addressed, your Honor, to G.H. Ill 
3 National Corporation of Las Vegas, Nevada, Mr. Florence 
4 has now transferred or committed that whatever fee he is 
5 going to get, if he was to get it, shall not be paid to 
6 him but shall be paid to a third party. 
7 Now, Mr. Florence in his Affidavit says he is 
8 the sole owner of that corporation. And I would accept 
9 the fact that he is the president, although it would not 
10 be the best evidence, he would properly testify that he 
11 is the sole owner. But I don't know if it would be 
12 admissible. It would require the Articles or the 
13 document, itself. But regardless of that, it is a 
14 different entity, a different person. And whatever 
15 interest Mr. Florence had in any commissions was 
16 released and discharged by the first document. 
17 And upon the second document it says, 
18 "Upon the closing of the transaction 
19 described below, S.N.L. Financial 
20 Corporation agrees to pay your company 
21 $50,000 as further payments on a monthly 
22 basis for 50 consecutive months." And it 
23 says, "The $50,000 is to be paid at the 
24 closing of said transaction. And such 
25 payments shall be in full satisfaction of 
18 
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1 Mr. McSwain at the hearing before the insurance 
2 department. It was clearly identified that Mr. Johnson, 
3 although he was to receive a note for a substantial sum 
4 of money, nevertheless, that was not payable absolutely 
5 but only in the event that premiums continued to be 
6 paid. 
7 In other words, he was to be paid out of the 
8 premiums that were paid to the company. And if the 
9 premiums were not enough, then he did not get his note 
10 paid. As I said, that was clearly explained before the 
11 insurance department. It was clearly explained in the 
12 correspondence. It was clearly explained in this 
13 contract for the purchase of the stock. 
14 THE COURT: Where is that you are reading 
15 from, counsel? 
16 MR. NIELSEN: What? 
17 THE COURT: Where is that you are referring 
18 to? 
19 MR. NIELSEN: That's at page 3 of the Stock 
20 Purchase Agreement that I had just reviewed with your 
21 Honor. 
22 THE COURT: You say itfs page 3. 1.9? 
23 MR. NIELSEN: 1.9, right. 
24 "Purchaser will issue or will cause to 
25 have issued and guarantee a premium note to 
20 
1 seller which shall be payable monthly." 
2 And it goes on and describes it. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. NIELSEN: There is no dispute as to what 
5 a premium note is, although again other documents in the 
6 file — Mr. Johnson's deposition does not refer to it 
7 but Mr. Quist's deposition, I think, does. And a 
8 premium note is one that is contingent upon the payment 
9 of the premiums. So that these people got into a 
10 discussion about trying to change the terms of this 
11 Stock Purchase Agreement when they were up in North 
12 Dakota on the 31st of May. And they were not able to 
13 agree, and so they agreed to disagree. 
14 Now, that was not the only disagreement. 
15 There were many. But the significant and important 
16 thing for this Motion for Summary Judgment is that the 
17 matter did not close. And so the conditions incident 
18 to the payment of this money to G.H. Ill National 
19 Corporation, not to Florence but to G.H. Ill, never came 
20 to fruition. 
21 It was there. The Agreement was there. It's 
22 a binding agreement. And we submit, your Honor, that if 
23 a condition incident to it did not take place, and 
24 regardless of what you might say about who was at fault 
25 or was not at fault, the matter remains that it just did 
21 
1 not occur; and therefore, the obligation to pay G.H. Ill 
2 Corporation never, shall I say, came to a point of when 
3 the payment would be required to be made. 
4 It was not that there wasn't any 
5 requirement. It's the date on which it is to be paid. 
6 And if I give your Honor a promissory note payable when 
7 somebody dies and the person doesn't die, I don't ever, 
8 I guess, have to pay it. That's a poor illustration of 
9 what I am trying to say. But it does illustrate the 
10 fact that a condition did attach, and therefore the 
11 payment did not become due. 
12 But in any event, if it had become due or if 
13 there is any claim of breach on the part of S.N.L., 
14 which Mr. Florence seems to indicate that there was, 
15 that it was S.N.L.'s thought that it didn't come to a 
16 closing, that would be the concern of G.H. Ill, not the 
17 concern of Florence. Because he has waived and released 
18 all his rights. It would be G.H. Ill's right if there 
19 is one to bring an action on the basis there was a 
20 breach on the part of S.N.L. of the conditions which 
21 made it impossible for performance; and therefore, G.H. 
22 III is entitled to payments or for damages by reason of 
23 that breach. 
24 We submit, therefore, that there is no 


































within the four corners of those two 
, Exhibits A and B to the Motion, and also 
to Mr. Quistfs deposition. And we submit, 
, we are entitled to summary judgment. 
MR. THURBER: Judge, before we begin, as I 
to Mr. Nielsen this morning and the Court 
, there is a later version of the document 
difficult to read. And it does have all the i 
And I think that's the one we should use. 
Mr. Nielsen has a copy and here is a copy for you. 
MR. NIELSEN: May I mention this, your Honor. 
The new document which Mr. Thurber has given to me 
purports 1 to have some marking at the very bottom of the 
page. I have shown that to Mr. George Quist, and he 
denies that that is his initials or any signature of 
his. And he is not aware of how or when that got onto 
the document. 
But as I have previously indicated, this 
document would be entirely a preliminary one, and there 
would be no way that I could identify which is 
Mr. Quist 
! will note 
1s handwriting and someone else's. And you 
that Mr. Quist, the initials do not appear in 
the margin next to any of the so-called changes or 
additions or corrections. 



























all that doesn't matter, your Honor. The point is that 
this is the latest version of the document that we are 
discussing. And whose initials are where doesn't matter 
for our purposes right now. i 
I think it's important for the Court to 
understand something about the background of this 
insurance company in North Dakota that was to be sold 
and acquired by S.N.L. here. This is a company that was 
founded by David Johnson, and he built this company --
it's a small, relatively small North Dakota domestic 
life insurance company — over the last 25 or 30 years 
with his own efforts. He was an insurance salesman who 
formed the company and built the company. 
The question, the issue that destroyed this 
closing was the question of his right to continue 
renewals. Now, renewals are something that are outside 
the terms of this sale. They aren't mentioned in the 
Sales Agreement, but they are mentioned in the May 19th 
agreement, specifically that Mr. Johnson will retain his 
renewals. 
Now, the renewals are simply the on-going 
commissions that result to any general or ordinary agent 
of a life insurance carrier for his production. And 
those are contractual matters between the company and 



























addition to being a major stockholder in the holding 
company. He was a general agent and had renewal rights 
in all of the production that he and his sub-agents had 
produced for this North Dakota insurance company. And 
these renewals meant in terms of present value dollars 
at the time that this closing should have occurred in 




So itfs a major, major item. 
Now, Mr. Nielsen in his argument failed to 
why it was that the deal didn't close in North 
He indicated that these people went up to 
North Dakota for the purpose of discussing the matter 
further But the evidence is and the testimony of 





of weeks ago in Fargo, that he was there and they 
ere for the purpose of closing. 
And Mr. Quist came with his checkbook and 
his bank balances and determined he didn't have 
to come up with $350,000 down payment, and asked 
Mr. Johnson to come up with the rest, the $150- of the . 
$200- that Mr. Quist had from his own company, which was 
agreed 
up with 
to. Mr. Johnson and he agreed with that. 
And then after this happened, Mr. Quist comes 
that brand new off-the-wall demand that Johnson 
throw in his renewals. It amounted to a demand for a 
25 
Mr. Nielsen's argument overlooks the entire 
body of Utah and neighboring state law relating to 
broker's commissions. This is a case that is not 
governed by the ordinary law of contracts, because it 
stands in a category of its own which is the category 
dealing with agents and brokers commissions. 
Consideration does not play a role in contracts of this 
nature. 
The well-established law in Utah and 
Colorado and Arizona and Idaho and other neighboring 
jurisdictions is that a broker performs his duty and 
becomes entitled to his commission, his agreed 
commission, when he produces a ready, willing and able 
buyer upon terms acceptable to both parties. 
Now, Mr. Nielsen has not mentioned anything 
in his memorandum or in his argument about that well-
established and accepted body of Utah law which applies 
clearly to the facts of this case. He in his latest 
memorandum suggests or he states — I think it's on page 
3 — that this case involving this transaction did not 
involve real property. 
Well, quite the opposite is true. If the 
Court will look at the documents, there were at least 
four pieces of real property, including a couple of 
office buildings, that were part of the consideration 
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1 that he ever signed. 
2 Now, going ahead with Mr. Nielsen's argument, 
3 he said that the parties went to Fargo for the purpose 
4 of further discussing this transaction and not for the 
5 purpose of closing. Well, that directly conflicts with 
6 both Mr. Florence's Affidavit -- he was present at that 
7 closing meeting — and what Mr. Johnson's deposition 
8 says, which was taken a couple of weeks ago. They both 
9 stated that the purpose of going there and the only 
10 purpose of going there was to close the transaction. We 
11 at the very least have an issue of fact regarding that. 
12 It's significant that the Form A filing, 
13 neither the Form A filing nor any of the other documents 
14 leading up to the closing meeting May 31st or the next 
15 morning, June 1st of 1984, say anything about 
16 Mr. Johnson giving up his renewals. And the only 
17 mention of his renewals is in the May 19, '83 Agreement 
18 which provides that Johnson will retain those renewals. 
19 That's a handwritten provision that was never changed 
20 throughout this thing. It's a contractual right that 
21 Johnson had to renewals between he and his insurance 
22 company that had nothing to do with the sale of the 
23 stock. 
24 Mr. Nielsen argues that because of the 
25 language of the Agreement about the closing date in 
31 
Denver and the fact that it was to be in Denver, this 
2 Ideal failed and there is no obligation on anybody's 
3 part. What he failed to point out is that that very 
4 Agreement stated that the closing would be then and 
5 there unless the parties mutually agreed otherwise. 
6 Now, the evidence here is that the parties in Denver 
7 agreed to adjourn for about a month. It was in April 
8 when they met in Denver to adjourn for about a month and 
9 finish it up in Fargo. The reason for that is that the 
10 seller's attorney had some I's to dot and T's to cross, 
11 but nothing substantial. Nothing of a substantive 
12 nature needed to be changed.. 
13 Now, Mr. Nielsen and Quist urge or argue that 
14 at the closing Mr. Johnson came up with a number of new 
15 and different conditions and demands. Mr. Florence in 
16 his Affidavit and Mr. Johnson in his testimony at Fargo 
17 have stated unequivocally that there was not a single 
18 new or different demand by Johnson. But the only change 
19 was this new off-the-wall demand by Quist that Johnson 
20 throw in his million dollars of renewals. And that 
21 killed the transaction. 
22 At the very least we have an issue of fact 
23 concerning why the transaction failed. But under the 
24 applicable law, it doesn't matter. If the law relating 
25 to brokers commissions applies to this transaction, 
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1 which it does, it doesn't matter that the transaction 
2 fails. The entitlement exists regardless of the closing 
3 happening or not. 
4 And the reason is very simple. The broker 
5 who brings the parties together, who negotiates or works 
6 out a mutually agreeable transaction between them, has 
7 no control from that point on over whether or not the 
8 transaction closes. And either party for reasons, for 
9 any reason or no reason, can decide not to go through 
10 with the deal. 
11 If the law were otherwise, the poor broker is 
12 left out in the cold after he, at his own expense, at 
13 his own effort and his own risk, has pulled together and 
14 put together a transaction or a deal. In this case we 
15 are talking about a multi-million-dollar deal. This 
16 isn't just a sale of a house or a garage. This is a 
17 big, big transaction that took more than a year of 
18 Mr. Florence1s time and effort and experience to put it 
19 together. That is the reason that a particular body of 
20 law applies to brokers agreements and commissions. And 
21 the usual law relating to contracts generally doesn't 
22 have complete application in this field. 
23 Going to the document on which Mr. Nielsen 
24 relies, if the Court examines both the Agreement and the 
25 so-called Release that are attached together and dated 
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1 May 31st, I think the Court will see quite clearly that 
2 we are dealing with a conditional agreement here. The 
3 conditions appearing in the Agreement of George Quist 
4 are two: One is that the Agreement be approved by 
5 Joseph Henroid. Now, Joseph Henroid — he is not now 
6 but he was at that time, as I understand it, associated 
7 in Mr. Nielsen's office. Mr. Nielsen represents S.N.L. 
8 and George Quist. 
9 Mr. Florence of course would have no control 
10 over what Mr. Henroid did or didn't do in the way of 
11 approval because Henroid was not Florence's attorney. 
12 So the point is, or the bottom line here is that the 
13 Agreement was never submitted to Mr. Henroid for 
14 approvals. He never even saw it at all. 
15 So by its very terms, a condition precedent 
16 to the validity or the enforceability of this Agreement 
17 didn't occur. Now, if a condition doesn't occur, the 
18 Agreement is void. And if the Agreement is void, we 
19 revert to the underlying agreement, which was the April 
20 22nd agreement of the previous year, providing for a 
21 $200,000 annuity. 
22 Now, going beyond that though, there was 
23 another condition, and this is the condition that on 
24 which Mr. Nielsen relies. That is that the closing 
25 occurred before a commission becomes due. Well, of 
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1 course it was the contemplation of the parties that a 
2 closing would occur. And this reduction of Florence's 
3 commission by $25,000 was the removal of the last 
4 impediment to a closing. So in everyone's mind, except 
5 perhaps Mr. Quist, it was contemplated that the closing 
6 would follow. He would pay the down payment of $350,000 
7 to Mr. Johnson, and everyone would go their way and the 
8 transaction would be concluded. 
9 If that had happened, of course Mr. Florence 
10 would be paid, or his wholly-owned company, G.H. Ill, 
11 would be paid the $50,000 down and 50 payments of $2,500 
12 a month. 
13 Now, if that had happened, then according to 
14 the Release Agreement that's attached, Mr. Florence 
15 would become obligated to release, but only then. And 
16 here is why: If we read the Release, this is the 
17 language of the release. It is not a present release; 
18 it's a contemplated release. It's a release to be given 
19 in the future. 
20 It says, 
21 "I, Giles Florence, in consideration of the 
22 letter dated May 31, '84 from Mr. George R. 
23 Quist, president of S.N.L. Financial 
24 Corporation, hereby agrees to release — 
25 hereby agree to release and forever 
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' « i a n e g o t. ,i a 11 rig s e s s i o n ; A + •••-: — f •*- *-- u e i cjosing. 
And Hi. Florence and Mr. J Ouusuu ^ i I wa1- i 
ciusing. He came with his checkbook and checked his 
balances, and then he changed the terms. 
For either of those rea* i 
those reasons, I submit su.mm.ary judgment would be 
-t.. wi-.w* a+ **h ) s point in Liit- - - ~ — 
MR. NIELSEN- V «?*••- n-i^iiv . ;;r " I 
_ i»Har * •-- disse^uiiuu uy e i t He r w 
relat- -.- " .. t.;ie r:,dckground does no**" suggest: r ,: ;-. xr 
Hor:or *•-^  r because mere aie diiferen^ " 
A . i<^  :- . - \ - --iccu rred , that there are d.i f f erences r t In. i i 
•re are issues of fact with respect to * r ml -i "I 
^r« . wh ich are those two documents ^er^ -* 
Now, I an surprised that n: 
^rence, when K ° says T *gree - : e*eas-
means tna* is going v.o uo J. L some i 
-urp. ocumen**• is en11 11 ed Release. : t; isn't 
ent i r ; <*,- Agreement to Release. He. releases An I i In-
I 11...i i .1. agree to release" is » common 
expression in a "1 1, releases. He hereby ricf rpt" ; I II i •> len" •  
•  p e r s o n , w h i c h is the r e 1 e a s e , i t s e 1 f , 
As long as those two documents ,> m i MINIMI 
i juous anJ "here are no issues ot fact, "There 
;M5 '.- An here hv M r , T h u r b e r or M r . Fl"r,'ar " '" •< h 
H\\ I i .sign either one of those by any traud or 
. ;s representation, although Mr. Thurber iinlli Hi I I I 
were some two hours "** -* merit about wh.j i lie was 
4 i.l 
1 :o get. .. ; and w h e n , before they p r e p a r e d these and 
2
 3 I g n e c i them. That merei 
^ I tva* t4»u -»4- T wr,j i -a - —is : i e ? • •" - " ir " s i enq * <~ 
xmocJc-UwWix aiag-out. & m a 
supersede any other. 
1 o bay that a x-e<A-L e " i 
cs*a <~sqn»*- mn •• w o day of closing * *• it be the day :i f 
-, -t <$ i n a -^  * -iny u L ne r t i me , s i gn a n a q r P P HI I »11 i i 11 i i i n i 
;i as to wl i at 1 lis c o m m i s s i o n is goir , - •;. ?e . s 
10 absolutely contrary s.w uic idw. F P 
11 agreement that says T ' ! n ~ ^ ~ " oercent r o m m ^ s s i o n 
12 But before the ^^ission ueuomes Q U 
13 pa Id he says - -» K p e r c e - ^ he: -e T ** 
14 transacti on is biased, that couid v e r * 
15 mi gl it be 12 percent The c o n d i t i o n s *;, m a n g e «:;d 
16 there is consideration for both ot rhf in in i in 
1 i release says that the consideration is the giving of the 
18 letter. 
1 9 Now, Mr, Florence wanted to make sure that he 
20 j was not going t: ::> **=• - v "k *\- ^m.o income whdtp' i i i i 
2 1 \ i"as goj i ig to be - ^ 1 a s e r3 H.j wanted it t. -
22 go t o h j s c o r p o r a t i *;***» + ± LiiaL o l i ie caw ininll In1 
2' ! agr eed a n i sai d In cons ide~^ 4 ~- - * ^ *--•?. l e t t e i , i 
2 4 hereby agree to re lease , " «J.J. i i y u i . MM I 
?!|! i i I I: h e consideration, „i s given. 
. • Now, if the events it i the letter +•« ut\*i~u he 
-f- aqr&e ''>*• dentifico the letter, do nuc OCCUJL-, 
..---*. o pay 3s not there And i f there i 
oreve. 
dispute with reference c /*r^ther or not somebody 
im ocnjrring taat does not cancel the 
agreement It j -p- not subrogate the agreement. 
4es .i.ves rise ^^ a cause of 
action fo*' *'".P Larson wh * i,_ m e recipient 
- - . j .r tn talrp action t.' . ^ 
compensation based upon tne fai U r e wi 3 N ";,. ^ r 
/.. *vj. -n- prevent ;t<? 
ari^f^ and rever* occurri n a t: nop^ 
P f o i i 1" t h P 
.ransaet I O 
v ;s Mr ,: ^ nnson w-




or em : f:m no t 
SUDSran^.a excess ot 
•rpventfcj. : r .. n r 1 o <* < n .
 fcJ> ^ ** w 
I' i) me t Iini•] I they bave sal 
-eneged because S J . L . said 
11" I "iir 1.1:1er commissions , 
• :. - goes back to the Stock: 
'i i rid ,i i t. e s l I ii:" fi a y m e i J t 
•eJJer based upon premiums, 
h,«in 1" woi«4 Lii he 
r: * ' irs. This man 
n n P v f «5 
^^rp^^-5 +. ,• ^  A n^ when we talk about Mr* Florence 
suffer!.ng any damac e- o . n . JU . 
^images by this transaction n ~ • going rnroogn after 
havir: ^peiit a n <JJ. cue ujune, tn<- <-• - • 3 
,-** M. ' "Swain a"!1 of which were pa.. : r N 
And ^h^n no-1- *-~ have •"his transaction "lose. 
it serins awfully — x w«o yumy Co sa 
swallow," That S.N T deciipf1 r-"1- **-- 1 "in ir- with 
t hip transaction, thd<* were anxious tu nave -> 
ihroui|h T submit, therefore, y^ur Honor, t:\c* 
basis of those two documeriCa, cnere o* t 
their language to s e ^ them and i nterpret: tii at: we are• 
entitled ihi summary judgment. 
["HE i.MJUHT i.'ounsej , I do want to give you my 
decision at this LJ 
Let me indicate +•« «~« 4-u-4. T <-pen-t 
considerable time going wvei y^ur memorandums and 
a r 1 1 u a v 11:.J , i he applicable i 3 w I guess the on] y t hing 
1 haven't s e e n .1 s t 11 e F n r m A 111 which has been referred 
1 1 1 II 1 1 • 1 1 I 1 I .1 1 111111 1111 1. L 11 JU ta s t a n 11 a t e s the p o s i t i o n t h a t 
the Court had while the Court was looking at this. 
V 1 P b 1. I;I i .J 1 I
 r let me indicate to you that 1 
do t h .1 nk • h<•-* Affidavit of Mr. Florence, as Mr Ni e3 se 1 1 
has pojhtiiJ out, 1';. t; lawed with certain material and 
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statements which would not be admissible in a court of 
law. However, there are statements in there that would 
be admissible. 
4 I But assuming and accepting all of the 
5 Affidavit, and assuming Mr. Thurber's position that this 
6 is a broker situation -- and I think his statement of 
7 the law is absolutely correct as far as a broker's 
S commission is concerned as far as producing an able and 
9 willing buyer — I first look at the letter of May 31st 
10 and the Release of the same date. And if the Court 
11 accepts those — of course I am bound to accept them --
12 but if I say they are the final documents, then by their 
13 terms, they state that the money is not due until the 
14 transaction or unless the transaction closes. The 
15 release would come into effect immediately upon the 
16 letter becoming effective. 
17 I don't think the release is effective until 
18 the letter — there is no release. There is nothing to 
19 be released until the letter becomes effective really. 
20 And of course that is the law of brokerages, as 
21 Mr. Thurber points out in his brief, that the commission 
22 is due to a broker when he produces that willing and 
23 able buyer, unless there are terms contained within the 
24 agreement that makes it otherwise. But I certainly 
25 think that there are terms contained within the letter 
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1 of May 31st. So as I say, assuming there was a 
2 brokerage situation, that that would prevent the 
3 commission from being paid. 
4 I donft think — I am not persuaded that the 
5 approval of Mr. Henroid has any bearing whatsoever as 
6 far as the situation is concerned. Itfs been pointed 
7 out here today, and I assumed that in reading this 
8 yesterday, that when it refers to a divorce situation, 
9 that it had something to do with the payment of money as 
10 far as the divorce and the parties were concerned. So I 
11 don't think that has any bearing on it. 
12 Now, again assuming that this is a brokerage 
13 situation, I go back to the letter of April 22nd and to 
14 Form A of which has been referred to here today. And on 
15 page 26, Section 15, the commission and finder's fee --
16 and of course I called Mr. Thurber yesterday and I 
17 believe he was in touch with Mr. Nielsen as to the 
18 wording of this paragraph 6, that the Court did feel 
19 this was a critical situation, that the wording was 
20 given to me. 
21 And of course as I was able to read it 
22 myself, which I could not make it all out, I am not 
23 persuaded that either the wording in paragraph 6 or the 
24 wording in the Form A is sufficient of a brokerage 
25 agreement to satisfy that a commission would be paid 
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1 upon the broker finding a willing and able buyer. I 
2 don't think it's sufficient writing to meet that 
3 requirement and must be in writing under the Statute of 
4 Frauds. That it does not spell out anything really as 
5 far as the terms. 
6 And I know Mr. Thurber argues in his brief 
7 that every particular term doesn't need to be spelled 
8 out. And I think that is correct also as far as the 
9 Agreement is concerned. But this one just does not even 
10 get to the heart of it as far as indicating what is 
11 going to be done as far as the payment of a finder's or 
12 brokerage fee. 
13 So assuming that everything that Mr. Thurber 
14 says in his argument as far as the Affidavit and as far 
15 as this being a brokerage transaction, I don't think the 
16 letter of April 22nd or anything in Form A says the 
17 requirement of the law of the Statute of Frauds or the 
18 requirement as far as what must be in writing for a 
19 brokerage. 
20 Now, I am of the opinion, and I so find, that 
21 I don't think that this is a brokerage situation. There 
22 is not the sale of real property here. Real property is 
23 being traded or paid for the stock. But this is not the 
24 sale of real property. Therefore, I don't think that 
25 law applies at the outset. 
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1 I am of the opinion that the wording in the 
2 April 22nd letter and the Form A is not sufficient to 
3 spell out that anything was going to be paid, regardless 
4 of what took place- I think the parties came down to 
5 it, that they did then negotiate, and there may have 
6 been some misunderstanding as far as what was supposed 
7 to be paid by Mr. Florence. They reduced that to 
8 writing as far as the letters of May 31st, the letter of 
9 Release of May 31st — I think that's the date, May 
10 31st, 1984. 
11 MR. NIELSEN: Yes, sir. 
12 THE COURT: And in those matters they did 
13 spell out that a commission was going to be paid upon 
14 the closing of the transaction, which never closed. I 
15 don't think it's material to this Court in this case as 
16 to why this transaction did or did not occur. That may 
17 be a cause of action in another action with other 
18 parties, some of these parties. But I don't think it is 
19 material as far as this particular case is concerned. 
20 I don't think the questions of fact — and I 
21 think there are questions of fact as far as what took 
22 place or what did not take place at the time of closing, 
2 3 and what was said and what was not said, and why it 
24 didn't close; there are disputes. But I don't think 
25 they are material as far as this particular case is 
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concerned. 
2 I So based on that, the Court does feel that 
3 the motion of the defendant is well taken and would 
4 grant the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
5 Mr. Nielsen, would you prepare the pleadings? 
6 MR. NIELSEN: May I prepare an Order and 
7 Judgment, your Honor, on the Motion? 
8 THE COURT: Yes. 
9 MR. THURBER: Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: If there are no further questions, 
11 court will be in recess. 














* * * 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 I STATE OF UTAH ) 
I • 
3 COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
4 I, SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM, do certify 
5 that I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered 
6 Professional Reporter with the Certificate of Merit, and 
7 Notary Public in and for the State of Utah. 
8 That at the time and place of the proceedings 
9 in the foregoing matter, I appeared as the court 
10 reporter in the Third Judicial District Court for the 
11 Honorable Judge Homer F. Wilkinson, and thereat reported 
12 in stenotype all of the proceedings had therein; 
13 That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of 
14 the Proceedings on the Motion for Summary Judgment were 
15 transcribed by computer into the foregoing pages; and 
16 that this constitutes a full, true and correct 
17 transcript of the same. 
18 WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake 
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Tab 3 
Hay 31, 1984 
!GH3 National Corporation 
^920 Paradise Road 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 
Gentlemen: 
jjpon the closing of the transaction described below, S.N.L. 
financial Corporation agrees to pay your company $50,000 
cash plus $2,500 a month for fifty (50) consecutive months 
Commencing 31 days after closing of the transaction whereby 
Security International Insurance Company is acquired by 
S.N.L. Financial Corporation. The $50,000 is to be paid 
it the closing of said transaction. Such payment shall be 
In full satisfaction of any and all claims of any kind or 
tature whether arising before or after the date hereof 
•gainst S.N.L. Financial Corporation, Security National Life, 
Tecurity Holding Corporation, Security International Corpora-
tion, Security International Insurance Company, Northwest 
•ales Co., George Quist or David Johnson. 
this agreement is subject to approval of Mr. Joseph Henroid 
If the law firm of Nielson.and Senior of Salt Lake City, 
pah, particularly in regard to that certain court order of 
jpproximately October, 1983, regarding the divorce of Giles H, 
pd Ululani Florence. 




I, Giles H. Florence, in consideration of a letter dated 
May 31, 1984, from Mr. George R. Quist, President of S.N.L. 
Financial Corporation, hereby agree to release and forever 
discharge all of the following corporations and persons from 
any further liability relating to the matters described in the 
letter referred to herein: 
S.N.L. Financial Corporation 
Security National Life 
Security Holding Corporation 
Security International Corporation 
Security International Insurance Company 
Northwest Sales Co. 
George R. Quist 
David Johnson 
This release is given this 31st day of May, 1984. 
Giles H. Florence 
Tab 4 
ANTHONY M. THURBER (#A3261) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 East Broadway, #735 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-0181 
IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GILES FLORENCE, : 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT OF GILES FLORENCE 
-vs- : Civil No. C85-2501 
S.N.L. FINANCIAL CORPORATION, : Judge Homer Wilkinson 
and GEORGE QUIST, 
Defendant.s 
Giles Florence being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and states: 
1. At all times material herein I have held a valid Utah Real 
Estate Agent's License authorizing me to derive commissions from 
the sale or exchange of real properties for cash or other forms of 
consideration. 
2. During the month of April, 1983 I obtained from one David 
Johnson of Fargo, North Dakota, an option to buy or sell Mr. 
Johnson's 62-1/2% control of Security International Corporation 
(SIC), a North Dakota holding company which owned 100% of the 
outstanding stock of Security International Insurance Company 
(SIIC), a domestic North Dakota life insurer. 
3. On or about April 22, 1983, defendant George Quist for and 
in behalf of defendant SNL Financial Corporation executed an 
agreement to purchase Mr. Johnson's holdings in SIC for certain 
consideration which included as Item 6 a $200,000 annuity in 
payment of my commission. Other terms of that agreement included 
the payment of certain amounts of cash, the exchange of certain 
real properties, and a premium note in favor of Mr. Johnson; the 
consideration totaling approximately $3,570,000 exclusive of my 
agreed commission. Exhibit A attached is a copy of that document 
bearing signatures and initials of George Quist as buyer, David 
Johnson as seller, and myself as the agent, all confirming and 
accepting the terms and conditions therein provided. 
4. The agreed commission provided by paragraph 6 thereof was 
the agreed consideration for my producing and bringing together a 
willing buyer and a willing seller on terms agreeable to each. The 
agreement to pay a commission was not and never has been dependent 
upon an actual closing. 
5. A refined typewritten agreement between the buyer and 
seller was executed during the month of May 1983 and is attached 
hereto as Exhibit B. By the terms and conditions of that 
agreement, all negotiations and "fine tuning" necessary to conclude 
a purchase and sale had been completed and agreed upon. All that 
remained to be done from that point on was to obtain board approval 
from the respective insurance companies and regulatory approval in 
2 
the state of North Dakota. 
6. Subsequent to May 19, 1983, necessary board approvals were 
in fact obtained from the involved companies1 respective boards of 
directors, and following a hearing on October 26, 1983, the North 
Dakota Commissioner of Insurance approved the transaction. 
7* All parties to the transaction, including attorneys for 
SNL Financial, David Johnson and myself met in the office of 
attorney Kermit Bye at Fargo, North Dakota on May 31, 1984 for the 
purpose of closing, as a firm agreement had been made and all 
required approvals had been obtained. Mr. George Quist at that 
time and for the first time asserted that it was my responsibility 
to pay the costs and attorneys fee incident to the transaction from 
my agreed commission of $200,000. I objected to that new demand 
as it was contrary to our agreement of the previous April. It is 
not customary or appropriate for agents to pay such costs and fees. 
8. Following a heated discussion with Mr. Quist and for the 
sole purpose of facilitating the closing for which the parties had 
traveled to Fargo, I reluctantly agreed to a reduction of $25,0000 
in my agreed commission; provided the closing followed immediately 
and Mr. Quist insisted upon no additional changes from the signed 
agreement. Mr. Quist and I thereupon executed the documents 
attached as Exhibit C, which were prepared by George Quist and 
Attorney Scott Quist his son in the office of Mr. Johnson's 
attorney Kermit Bye, where we had all met for the closing that day. 
3 
9. The agreement dated May 31, 1983 included as a condition 
that it was subject to the approval of Joseph L. Henriod, a Salt 
Lake City attorney; particularly in regard to that certain court 
order of approximately October 1983 regarding the divorce between 
myself and my ex-wife Ululani Florence* 
10. The subject documents were never submitted to, reviewed, 
nor approved by Attorney Joseph Henriod, for the reasons appearing 
below. 
11. On June 1, 1984, all the parties including myself again 
met in the office of Attorney Kermit Bye in Fargo, North Dakota for 
the purpose of finally closing the transaction, as all the terms 
and conditions had previously been agreed upon and I had agreed to 
a reduction of $25,000 in my commission. At the commencement of 
the meeting, Mr. George Quist called his office in Salt Lake City 
to determine whether his company's bank balance was sufficient to 
cover the $350,000 down payment required to be made that morning 
to Mr. David Johnson, and learned that his balance was 
approximately $150,000 deficient. He thereupon asked Mr. David 
Johnson to authorize his company (SIIC) to make up the deficiency; 
as both companies would after the transaction become as one. Mr. 
Johnson agreed after calling his company to determine its current 
bank balance, which was sufficient. 
4 
12. Mr. George Quist then surprised all those present by 
stating to Mr. David Johnson "you are going to include your 
renewals, aren't you"? The retention of his renewals by Mr. 
Johnson was an item which had been negotiated and agreed upon in 
writing by the parties as early as May 19, 1983 (See Exhibit B 
attached). The relinquishing of his renewals by Mr. Johnson would 
amount to a reduction in the purchase price being paid by the 
Quist-SNL contingent by an amount in excess of $1,000,000; and was 
a new condition which was totally unacceptable to Mr. Johnson. 
13. Mr. Johnson properly refused to acceed to Mr. Quist!s 
new and unexpected demand, and the transaction did not close as 
anticipated that day, or ever. Mr. Johnson thereafter sold his 
interests for the same price as had been agreed upon by Mr. Quist 
and SNL Financial, without relinquishing his renewals. That sale 
involved no commission at all. 
14. The day before we left for the closing in Fargo, North 
Dakota, I met: with George Quist and SNL's Attorney Scott Quist in 
Salt Lake City at their request to discuss the closing. They 
suggested to me that they planned to "force" David Johnson to 
relinquish his renewals because of a deadline set by the Minnesota 
Commissioner of Insurance for increasing the capitol of SIIC by 
$1,000,000, the deadline being June 6 of the following week. They 
indicated that they knew there was no way for Mr. Johnson to raise 
the required additional capital than through the proposed sale, for 
5 
the reason he had not sought out other sources in reliance upon 
George Quis t' s committment . They stated they tiioi lg h t Mr J ohnson 
would "give in" because of the impending deadline. 
When that suggestion was made, I informed the Quists that 
ha u e no part in such an attempt to reduce the purchase 
price or otherwise change the terms of the purchase agreement in 
any way, as all the terms had been fully agreed upon and required 
approvals of the respective boards and regulatory authority upon 
those terms had been obtained. I told them I wou] d no t consider 
any such attempt to blackmail, and that I would be no part of it. 
16. There was no excuse, legal, equitable, or otherwise, for 
the defendan ts failure ' close transaction upon the agreed 
terms June 1, 1984, 
17. I have fully performed the duties of an agent i n bringing 
a ready, willing and able buyer and seller together upon mutually 
agreeable terms, and in satisfying all the conditions specified by 
Mr. Quis* .i his April 22, 1983 agreement 
18. The agreed commission was to be paid by George Quist and 
Security National Life, and not the seller David Johnson, according 
to tlif u ~ r "" > of the su bject agreement of Mr Qu 1st and SNL dated 
April 1983. 
1:?. To my knowledge Mr. Quist never obtained 1: oard appro^ ? a] 
of Security National Life or its holding company SNL Financial to 
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change the terms of the agreement with Mr. Johnson which existed 
a t the time of closing. Boar: d approval had been obtained upon the 
terms originally agreed as they appear in the attached Exhibit B. 
It is my understanding and belief that George Quist on his own 
initiative demanded the additional, unreasonable, and unacceptable 
concession of Mr. Johnson to lower his price by an amount in excess 
of $1,000,000 for the purpose of forcing Mi .lohjison l;n romplete 
the transaction at the lower price because of the impending 
deadline in Minnesota. 
'. I informed David B. Johnson ui April I'M 3, ul my $2 00,000 
annuity commission agreement to be paid by SNL Financial 
Corporation, and that there would be no commission obligation to 
me from M.i , Johnson in connection with the transaction. 
GILES FLORENCE 
VERIFICATION 
I have read the foreging affidavit and declare the contents 
thereof I:a hr- IIIIH to the best, ol my knowledge, recollection and 
belief. - ^ — . \ 
GILES FLORENCE ~~ 
7 
ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to befoie ne I Ins /&) day ot May, 
1990. 
ZOSOIRI 
j , «y/ - ^ 
tovr.fr faeion" ^ f* ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residing, 
STalt Lake County, Utah 
J] Expjrss v«w. T 6, 1992 l.'» 
I JUCiTH VHHRY 
l \ 3 Has.' 8roaawsy #735 
\ \ t f > Call Laka City, 
\\ ^  U T 3 4 1 0 1 V 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit, postage prepaid, this * day ot May, 19 90, to the 
following: 
Arthur Mielsen 
Nielsen & Senior 
36 South State Street, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
1 







IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 







uxvil No. C85-2501 
Deposition of: 
GEORGE QUIST 
BE IT REMEMBERED that >ui Thursday, t ht- IHli 'lay 
of February, 198 6, commencing at the hour of 10:00 a.m., 
the deposition of GEORGE QUIST, produced as a witness 
at tJ:ie i nstai 1 ce and r equest of 11 le P1 a Intif f in the 
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named Court, 
was taken before me, JILL CROXFORD, a Certified^ Shorthand 
Kepox: tei: a nd Notary Public, in and for the State of 
Utah, at the offices of Anthony M. Thurber, 8 East Broadway, 
Suite 735, Salt Lake City, Utah; an<I 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to 
Notice. 
* * * 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 KEARNS BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
2 
r" A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the P l a i n t i f f : 
Fo r; t h e D e f e n d a n t : 
Also Present: 
Anthony M. Thurber 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 735 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City/Utah 84 — 1 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys at Law 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 




I N D E X 
GEORGE QUIST 
Examination by Mr, Thurber 
* * * 
Page 
Number Description 
1 Letter of 5-19-83 
2 Handwritten Note of 4-1-82 
3 Handwritten Note of 4-22-83 
4 Statement Regarding Acquisition 
of Control 







ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 K6ARNS BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
3 
E £ 0 £ I 5 ° I N G S 
GEORGE QUIST, 
called as a witness for and on behalf of 
the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as foil ows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR, THURBER; 
Q. ^  Mr. Quistr would yoi i please state your name 
and address for the record. 
A George R. Quist, 4491 Wander Lane, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
Q How long a time have you resided in the Salt 
Lake area? 
A -I was born in Salt Lake County. 
Q So, all your life? 
A- Ne a i: 1 y a 1 1 my 1 1 f e. 
Q What is the nature of your relationship with 
S# N. L. Financial Corporation and its affiliates? 








and what are 
Well, it"s 
generally and quickly, 
its affiliates? 
a holdii lg company which 
National Life and other properties. 
Do you hold the same 
affiliated companies? > 
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A Yes. 
Q How was Mr. Florence compensated for his 
.nvolvement in it, simply the acquisition of the loan? 
A I'm not sure I can answer for Mr. Florence. 
ri , Q He wasn't paid a finder's fee or a commissi on 
6 froni the Security National Life end of the transaction, 
7 was he? 
D A He paid S e c u r i t y N«"it. i na 1, Life a I ee to make 
the CD deposit in the bank in Wyoming. 
10 • Q So, beyond that, you have no knowledge of how 
lie w ";is compensated, ii -it, il I 
12 A I have no knowledge. 
1,3 Q Do you recall when It was Mr. Florence 
14 f i rs t came to you wi th a proposal concerning Mr David 
15 Johnson's companies? 
16 A As I recall, it was the spring of 198 3. 
1,7 Q How did' he come to you or how dl d he come 
18 into contact concerning that matter? Did- he call you 
] and come and discuss it? 
20 A Florence contacted me. 
23 Q Did he come to you directly or did he come in 
22 a "9"ro"i ip o f the officers o f yoi i i < ::onip a n/y a t £ :i i:s t? 
23 ' . A I think initially, it was myself. 
24 Q Do you recall, was it face-to-face meeting or 
26 did you learn of the possibility of that acquisition 
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j — : • • 
by telephone? 
A As I recall at the moment, it was from a 
telephone call. 1 think he said he was in Arizona• 
Did he describe to you what he or what 
Mr Johnson ! ::.: : -ffer? 
A It may have been the initial contact. It may 
have been in the form of a question. 
Wei I , i n a nj event, d id y on learn tha t there 
was a holding company and a wholly-owned North Dakota 
Domestic Insurance life insurance company available for 
acquisition? 
a^s so informed. 
During the ensuing several weeks, were negotiations 
undertaken? 
• A Yes. 
Q And was an agreement fina 1 ] y reached and si gned 
or initialed outlining the terms of a proposed acquisition? 
A The general terms were. 
Q A rid i s t 1 lat agreement tilii s the prelimina ry 
form of it, what appears on S.N.L. letterhead, three-page 
document dated May 19 of 1983? 
A' This was prepared !:c)i Mi Inlmson. 
Q This document has a number of typewritten 
provisions and then a number of handwritten interlineations 
and additions. Do you see that and a number of initials? 
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A Yes. 
Q Can you tell me who drafted t- he agreement, 
he typewritten portions of it? 
A I would suspect our joint thinking went Into it 
o l ana che actual drafting may have been J eft to o-ur corporate 
6 I counsel. 
Q In any events from the fact that - he typewritten 
pc ; -. <ijn«-w* appec.i • nancial 
Corporation letterhead, does that suggest to you that it 
was prepared within the S.N.L. organization? 
A Yeii 
i: . Q : Now, do you recall a meeting or a series of 
}^ meetings at which the changes .-*-•} acid it ion1-, v-. • discussed 
] id agreed upon? 
If • A You would have to enumerate it, vcu would 
^ j3e j^ n^(:j e n o Ugj ;i ^  ^ 0 e n u m erate the changes e referring 



















you present when 
A N( ). 
Who was, 
x vu. w ix u 
if 
I'm asking you about now 
anciwL L 11 en Inter! ineations 
document• First, 
those changes were 
you know? 
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1 WHEREUPON, 
2 the following proceedings were had, 
3 to-wit: 
4 DAVID B. JOHNSON, a witness, called 
5 by the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn, 
6 testified on his oath as follows: 
7 BY MR. THURBER EXAMINATION 
8 Q. Will you state your full name and 
9 your address for the record please, Mr. 
10 Johnson? 
11 A. My name is David, middle initial 
12 B. Johnson. My address is Route 1, Box 391, 
13 Fargo, North Dakota, 58104. 
14 Q. Will you review for us just 
15 briefly the nature of your educational 
16 background and experience? 
17 A. I'm a graduate of North Dakota 
18 State University. I took graduate work in 
19 business administration at Stanford 
20 University and the University of Minnesota. 
21 Q. How long a time have you resided 
22 in this area, that is, the Fargo area? 
23 A. I have lived in Fargo since I 
24 believe in 1960. 
25 Q. Will you tell us how and when you 
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1 A* Well, I'll read off the document 
2 if you want me to. 
3 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) Well, read us 
4 what it says. 
5 A. Point 6 there's a figure of, Point 
6 6, $200,000 and then the next word that I can 
7 read says annuity and I can't read the rest 
8 of it* 
9 Q* Okay. Do you know what that — 
10 let me ask you first, did the proposal of the 
11 Quists to you involve that $200,000 annuity 
12 to you or to anyone in your family? 
13 A. No. I really knew nothing about 
14 it up to — I certainly knew when I signed 
15 this document that there was a request, the 
16 request of a $200,000 annuity. But other 
17 than that I was not to receive anything of 
18 that. 
19 Q. Do you know who was to be the 
20 beneficiary of that if anyone? 
21 MR. NIELSEN: Objection. 
22 Speculative. This person would never 
23 know. 
24 A. Giles. He was to be compensated 
25 by an annuity. 
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1 conversation with reference to renewals* If 
2 renewals had ever come up where I was to give 
3 up any of my renewals, the negotiation would 
4 have ceased at that time. 
5 Qc Had there been any discussion or 
6 suggestion from the Quist side of the table 
7 that any of the terms and conditions 
a reflected by Exhibit 4 be changed, be 
9 materially changed or changed at all from May 
10 of '83 until this meeting on June 1 of 1984? 
11 A* No. Other than the fine tuning 
12 that you see depicted on the various sheets 
13 of paper. 
14 Q. Were you ready, willing and able 
15 to close on those terms, namely, the May 1983 
16 terms on the morning of June 1, 1984? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Qe Was there any other reason for the 
19 meeting than to close? 
20 A. Not that I know of. 
21 Q. All right. After the discussion 
22 that you've related about the down payment of 
23 $350,000 was concluded, tell us what happened 
24 next. 
25 A. Well, George stated that they had 
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1 no intention of paying me the renewals and 
2 basically that was the end of the 
3 discussion* I left my mind open to see if 
4 they'd change their mind and really nothing 
5 happened after that date. I don't recall 
6 any communication with them after they left 
7 on the 1st. 
8 Q. Was that the first discussion that 
9 had been made to you about relinquishing your 
10 renewals?* 
11 A. It's the only time that renewals 
12 were mentioned that I was going to forfeit my 
13 renewals. Like I said a moment ago, I would 
14 have never proceeded with another matter with 
15 the Quists had that ever come up prior to the 
16 closing date of June 1 of '84. 
17 Q. In terms of volume or in terms of 
18 dollars in this transaction what difference 
19 would have been made had you relinquished 
20 your renewals? 
21 A. Well, I'm going to estimate that 
22 my renewals at that time would have been 
23 running between 5 and 10,000 a month. And 
24 so you're talking a very significant amount 
25 of money over the years and it could be in 
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1 the range of or close to a million dollars. 
2 Q. And would the bottom line effect 
3 of relinquishing renewals had you done so at 
4 Mr. Quist's request been to reduce his cost 
5 of acquisition by that amount? 
6 MR. NIELSEN: I object to the form 
7 of the question. Leading and suggestive. 
8 A^ Over the period it would have been 
9 reduced by the amount of the renewals. 
10 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) And was that 
11 something acceptable to you? 
12 MR. NIELSEN: Same objection. 
13 A. I had stated twice during the 
14 deposition that I would have absolutely 
15 refused to negotiate any further with the 
16 Quists had the subject of renewals and my 
17 forfeiture of the renewals against the 
18 purchase price ever come up. I feel that we 
19 basically wasted one year in this, in the 
20 matter of negotiations. 
21 Q. I'm going to read to you just a 
22 couple of statements by Mr. Scott Quist in 
23 his deposition which appear at pages 13 and 
24 14 and just ask you to, for your 
25 observations. At page 14 Mr. Quist makes 
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1 the statement relating to your demands as of 
2 June 1, 1984. That they were "all very 
3 dramatic changes. And that they" — meaning 
4 your demands -- "were specifically not agreed 
5 to in the forme, not contained in the forme." 
6 Can you comment on that statement? 
7 MR. NIELSEN: I object to the form 
8 of the question. No proper foundation. 
9 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) Well, let me ask 
10 it this way. Were there any dramatic, what 
11 could be remotely termed dramatic changes in 
12 your position as of June 1, 1984? 
13 A. None whatsoever. 
14 Q. Dramatic or otherwise? 
15 A. That is correct. 
16 Q. Would there be any truth to the 
17 notion or the statement that from the point 
18 of your demands or your position the "basic 
19 structure had changed"? 
20 A. No. 
21 MR. NIELSEN: I object to that on 
22 the same grounds. 
23 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) Or that your 
24 terms were "radically different"? 
25 A. That statement is utterly 
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1 ridiculous. 
2 Q. Or that your position as of June 
3 1, 1984 bore no resemblance to the May 
4 1983 --
5 MR- NIELSEN: Same objection. 
6 A. Again utterly ridiculous. 
7 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) Specifically had 
8 any of your terms changed regarding or your 
9 demands changed as of June 1, 1984 regarding 
10 any of the following matters, first, the 
11 manner or the amount of the consideration to 
12 be paid to you? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Secondly, the premium note 
15 provided by the agreement being contingent or 
16 fixed, that is the payment pursuant to the 
17 premium note being contingent or fixed? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Third, the continuation, matter of 
20 continuation of presidental compensation to 
21 you? 
22 A* All I received from the company 
23 other than in the formative years after 1963 
24 were commissions for running the company and 
25 being responsible for virtually all of the 
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1 sales. And at one time some of the 
2 compensation was under a different caption. 
3 At no time have I ever been paid a salary per 
4 se as a president or in any other capacity. 
5 My commissions were at one standard or fixed 
6 rate and they continued. 
7 Q. Fourth, the maintenance of agents 
8 office facilities? 
9 A. During our Denver meeting I had 
10 suggested to George Quist that he consider 
11 continuing paying our agency director of a 
12 salary for a, for a possible year as a means 
13 of simplifying this change of ownership. 
14 Mr. Davidson at the time knew virtually all 
15 of the stockholders and all of the policy 
16 holders, and in order to pacify and work with 
17 these people and to assure him of the merits 
18 of the merger, I thought it would be to the 
19 company's advantage to be supportive of Mr. 
20 Davidson. But that was only a suggestion, 
21 not a demand or even a request. 
22 Q. And, fifth, the provision or the 
23 supplying of banks for the agents to solicit 
24 from which the agents might solicit bank 
25 business after the transaction? 
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1 A. If you'll refer to Mr. Quist's 
2 original offers, they agreed to set up the 
3 banks at their expense. Later on in the 
4 negotiations they offered Northwest Sales 
5 Company an additional commission rate I 
6 believe of 5 percent if we would take on that 
7 responsibility of signing up the banks, but 
8 originally that was to be their job. So that 
9 statement is again completely false. 
10 Q* Were there any terms reflected by 
11 either the forme submission of Scott Quist 
12 dated September 28, 1983 or the letter 
13 agreement and interlineated and initialed May 
14 19, 1983 that were not totally acceptable to 
15 you on June 1, 1984? 
16 MR. NIELSEN: Object to the form 
17 of the question. 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) Your answer? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Did you ever either orally or in 
22 writing either suggest any different terms? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Did you ever request of the 
25 Quists, either of them, that Giles not be 
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1 contacted about any aspect of this 
2 transaction? 
3 A. Would you repeat that? 
4 Q^ Did you ever request of the Quists 
5 that Giles Florence not be contacted 
6 concerning any aspect of this transaction? 
7 MR. NIELSEN: Same objection. 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) Did you ever 
10 suggest to the Quists that you didn't want to 
11 deal with Mr. Florence? 
12 A. No. 
13 MR. NIELSEN: Same objection. 
14 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) As of June 1, 
15 1984 had Mr. Florence done all that you 
16 wanted or expected of him? 
17 MR. NIELSEN: Same objection. 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) Was there 
20 anything remaining to be done in what Giles 
21 Florence had been undertaking to do? 
22 MR. NIELSEN: Same objection. 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) Was Mr. Quists 
25 demand on the morning of June 1, 1984 
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1 something you would describe or not describe 
2 as a radical change in the agreement? 
3 MR. NIELSEN: Same objection. 
4 A. Absolutely. And I refer to my 
5 former answers, had that ever come up that 
6 the negotiations would have stopped at that 
7 point- It would have been totally 
8 unacceptable from the very beginning, from 
9 the very mention of giving up of the 
10 renewals. 
11 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) Do you know why 
12 Mr. Quist inserted that demand into this 
13 transaction on that date? 
14 MR. NIELSEN: Same objection. 
15 A. I don't know why he did that. I 
16 can refer to one passing thought --
17 MR. NIELSEN: Let me interject 
18 here. Apparently Mr. Florence is coaching 
19 Mr. Johnson. Mr. Florence just made a 
20 comment to Mr. Johnson which Mr. Johnson 
21 apparently is now going to interject in his 
22 testimony and I object to it and I object to 
23 the fact that he has also done this before. 
24 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) Okay. We only 
25 want you to testify from your own 
DOUG KETCHAM & ASSOCIATES 
Box 3165, Fargo, N.D. 58108, (701)237-0275 
6 2 
1 recollection. 
2 A. No. I realize that Giles said 
3 something, but I also related to you earlier 
4 this morning that I have no hearing in my 
5 right ear and my left eardrum was shot out by 
6 the Shriners during an initiation and so I 
7 have a great difficulty hearing. I did hear 
S the word Minnesota. 
9 And I'll refer back to my sheet 
10 that gives the date of the Florence matter on 
11 5-4-84, and this had been referred to and 
12 discussed prior to this moment, that I called 
13 Giles Florence on that date and he stated, it 
14 says here, states George Quist trying to make 
15 distress buy of Security International 
16 Insurance Company due to the Minnesota 
17 capital and surplus problem. 
18 But I had no, no idea other than 
19 an assumption that this could have some part 
20 of why George Quist came in at the last 
21 minute and tried to renegotiate the price 
22 based on the forfeiture of my renewals other 
23 than to try to beat down the price assuming 
24 that we're under pressure to act because of 
25 the Minnesota situation. And I can assure 
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1 you that that tactic would never work with me 
2 because we could have forfeited Minnesota 
3 from that standpoint plus I had other means 
4 of raising that money. 
5 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) Can you identify 
6 for us anything other than this new demand of 
7 Mr. Quist's that morning of June 1 that 
8 caused this transaction to fail, anything 
9 else? 
10 MR. NIELSEN: I object to it on 
11 the form of the question and calls for a 
12 speculative answer of the witness. 
13 A. No. 
14 .Q. (BY MR. THURBER) Was that the end 
15 of the discussion with Mr. Quist? 
16 A. Well, I know on that date that 
17 Quist also had an appointment with Basil 
18 Walker on 6-1 of '84 and that he went over 
19 and met with him at the Townhouse, had lunch 
20 over there at the Townhouse. 
21 Q. Was that before or after this? 
22 A. This would have been after the 
23 meeting in the morning. Yes, it would have 
24 been at noon. 
25 Q. Did the transaction go any 
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1 further? 
2 A. Well, I never heard from them 
3 again after this time* 
4 Q. After June 1 what happened with 
5 regard to the sale of your position? 
6 A, Well, I communicated with actuary 
7 Mr. Bill Buchanan and he apparently suggested 
8 a — 
9 MR. NIELSEN: I object to any 
10 conversations with somebody else on the 
11 grounds that it's hearsay. 
12 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) You can tell us 
13 what you did. 
14 A. Well, I talked to Mr. Buchanan and 
15 he apparently suggested that a fellow, one of 
16 his clients come up and view and examine 
17 Security International and this gentleman 
18 ultimately did come up here. So that was 
19 it. 
20 Q. Was a sale on the same or similar 
21 terms as the Quist agreement negotiated? 
22 A. Yes. On 10-10, 1984 we concluded 
23 the sale of our controlling interest in 
24 Security International Corporation and 
25 insurance company to another party, yes. 
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1 Q. And was it on the same or 
2 different terms to which you agreed with Mr, 
3 Quist? 
4 A. It was on the, I would say almost 
5 identical terms. 
6 Q. And what if anything was done with 
7 regard to your renewals in that transaction? 
8 A. I continue to receive my renewals 
9 and I continue to receive them to this date. 
10 Q. Was there any suggestion made at 
11 the closing of that transaction that you 
12 relinquish your renewals? 
13 A* No. 
14 Q. And who was the buyer? 
15 A* The buyer was American Insurance 
16 Management Company, Incorporated out of 
17 Phoenix, Arizona. 
18 Q. Were those same terms acceptable 
19 to you both before and after the June 1, 1984 
20 meeting with Mr. Quist? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. From your standpoint as a party to 
23 this transaction had Mr. Giles performed 
24 totally what he'd undertaken to perform? 
25 MR. NIELSEN: Same objection. 
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1 It's leading and suggestive and calls for a 
2 conclusion. 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) Was there 
5 anything more for him to do? 
6 A» There was nothing more that I knew 
7 of. 
8 Q* Had he produced a ready and able 
9 buyer? 
10 MR. NIELSEN: Same objection. 
11 A* Yes. 
12 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) On terms 
13 acceptable to you? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q» Was there anything more that a 
16 broker or a finder is required to do? 
17 MR. NIELSEN: Same objection. 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. (BY MR. THURBER) From your point 
20 of view was there an enforceable agreement 
21 with — 
22 MR. NIELSEN: Same — 
23 MR. THURBER: Let me finish the 
24 question, please. Was there an enforceable 
25 agreement with the Quist interest as of June 
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failure to comply in any way with or perform any term, covenant or 
condition of this Agreement or any related agreement, docunent or 
instrument executed or to be executed pursuant to or in connection with 
this Agreement; (c) the inaccuracy of any certificates to be supplied by 
any officer of Security Holding pursuant to this Agreement. 
14.3 Special Provisions As a condition precedent to the right to 
receive any indemnification hereunder, the party seeking indemnification 
shall give the indemnitor prompt written notice of any event which might 
give rise to a claim from indemnification specifying the nature of the 
possible claim and the amount believed to be involved. If the claim for 
indemnification arises from a claim or dispute with any third party, the 
indemnitor shall have the right, at its own expense, to defend such claims 
or disputes and the indemnified party shall cooperate with the indemnitor 
in such defense. The indemnitor shall reimburse the indemnified party at 
any time after the Closing, based on the judgment of any court of competent 
jurisdiction or pursuant to a bona fide compromise or settlement or claims, 
demands or actions In respect of any damages to which the indemnification 
hereinabove set forth relates. 
SECTION FIFTEEN 
Commissions and Flndersy Fees 
Finder SIC and Security Holding agree that Mr. Giles Florence of 
Phoenix, Arizona, has acted as a finder In connection with the transactions 
contemplated herein and that no other party will serve as a finder. The 
parties agree that their respective expenses Incurred and to be Incurred In 
connection with the transactions contemplated hereby, including without 
limitation, attorneys1 fees, accountants'* fees, travel, printing, mailing 
and postage, shall be deducted from the fee of Mr. Florence. 
SECTION SIXTEEN 
Plan of Dissolution and Liquidation 
It Is the intention of the parties hereto that this Agreement and the 
transactions set forth herein be considered a purchase and liquidation 
within the meaning of Sections 338 and 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954, as amended. 
26 
